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In public-sector procurement, governments frequently offer programs that give preferential treatment to
certain groups of firms. My dissertation examines how these programs affect procurement outcomes. I study
two types of preference programs: subcontracting requirements, where the government requires that a
particular percentage share of a contract be completed by preferred subcontractors, and bid discounts, where
the government lowers the bids of preferred firms for comparison purposes and pays the full price to the firm
with the lowest bid. My dissertation has two chapters.
My first chapter addresses subcontracting requirements applied under New Mexico's Disadvantaged Business
Enterprise Program. This program uses subcontracting requirements to support firms considered
disadvantaged in federal procurement, which are small firms owned and controlled by minorities or women.
Theoretically, I find that subcontracting requirements need not substantially increase the final cost of
procurement, even when preferred firms are relatively more costly. The intuition behind this result is that, by
restricting the pool of subcontractors, firms know more about their competitors' costs, which causes firms to
reduce their markups. Using an empirical version of the theoretical model estimated on New Mexico's federal
procurement data, I find that subcontracting requirements only increased procurement costs by 0.3 percent
yet led to a 12.7 percent increase in the amount of money awarded to preferred subcontractors.
My second chapter investigates bid discounts awarded to resident firms under New Mexico's Resident
Preference Program. Unlike other papers in the bid discounting literature, my methodology accounts for
potentially affiliated project costs -- which is likely to arise in these procurement settings since firms typically
share subcontractors and suppliers. Using an empirical auction model estimated on data from New Mexico's
Resident Preference Program, I find that offering preference to resident bidders led to a 1.2 percent increase in
procurement costs; however, procurement costs are 2.9 percent higher than would be predicted if the model
did not account for project-cost affiliation. This chapter highlights the importance of accounting for affiliation
in the evaluation of bid preference programs.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON PREFERENCE PROGRAMS IN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
Benjamin V. Rosa
Hanming Fang
In public-sector procurement, governments frequently offer programs that give preferential
treatment to certain groups of firms. My dissertation examines how these programs affect
procurement outcomes. I study two types of preference programs: subcontracting require-
ments, where the government requires that a particular percentage share of a contract be
completed by preferred subcontractors, and bid discounts, where the government lowers the
bids of preferred firms for comparison purposes and pays the full price to the firm with the
lowest bid. My dissertation has two chapters.
My first chapter addresses subcontracting requirements applied under New Mexico’s Disad-
vantaged Business Enterprise Program. This program uses subcontracting requirements to
support firms considered disadvantaged in federal procurement, which are small firms owned
and controlled by minorities or women. Theoretically, I find that subcontracting require-
ments need not substantially increase the final cost of procurement, even when preferred
firms are relatively more costly. The intuition behind this result is that, by restricting the
pool of subcontractors, firms know more about their competitors’ costs, which causes firms
to reduce their markups. Using an empirical version of the theoretical model estimated
on New Mexico’s federal procurement data, I find that subcontracting requirements only
increased procurement costs by 0.3 percent yet led to a 12.7 percent increase in the amount
of money awarded to preferred subcontractors.
My second chapter investigates bid discounts awarded to resident firms under New Mexico’s
Resident Preference Program. Unlike other papers in the bid discounting literature, my
methodology accounts for potentially affiliated project costs – which is likely to arise in
v
these procurement settings since firms typically share subcontractors and suppliers. Using
an empirical auction model estimated on data from New Mexico’s Resident Preference
Program, I find that offering preference to resident bidders led to a 1.2 percent increase
in procurement costs; however, procurement costs are 2.9 percent higher than would be
predicted if the model did not account for project-cost affiliation. This chapter highlights
the importance of accounting for affiliation in the evaluation of bid preference programs.
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CHAPTER 1 : Subcontracting Requirements and the Cost of Government
Procurement
1.1. Abstract
Government procurement contracts are frequently subject to policies that specify, as a per-
centage of the total project, a subcontracting requirement for the utilization of historically
disadvantaged firms. I study how such subcontracting policies affect procurement auction
outcomes using administrative data from New Mexico’s Disadvantaged Business Enterprise
(DBE) Program. My analysis is based on a procurement auction model with endogenous
subcontracting. Theoretically, I show that subcontracting requirements need not trans-
late into substantially higher procurement costs – even when disadvantaged firms are rela-
tively more costly. The intuition behind this result is that subcontracting programs require
that prime contractors select their subcontractors from a common pool of disadvantaged
firms, which reduces the private information prime contractors have on their own project-
completion costs. As a result of losing private information, prime contractors strategically
reduce their markups in their bids, and the reduction in markups can be sufficiently high to
mitigate the cost increases from using more costly subcontractors. I estimate an empirical
version of the model and find that New Mexico’s past subcontracting requirements led to
only small increases in procurement costs.
1.2. Introduction
Public procurement is a sizable part of US government spending. In 2013, public procure-
ment amounted to 26.1 percent of US government spending and just over 10 percent of US
GDP.1 The government awards a portion of that spending to firms that, because of either
size or past practices of discrimination, it considers to be disadvantaged. In 2013, the US
federal government awarded 23.4 percent of its procurement spending to small businesses
and 8.61 percent of its procurement spending to small businesses owned and controlled by
1See the OECD’s Government at a Glance 2015 report for more information on other countries.
1
ethnic minorities and women.2 To obtain these levels of participation, the US regularly es-
tablishes subcontracting requirements on its federal procurement projects, which specify a
percentage of the total award amount that should be given to preferred firms. For example,
if a contract valued at $100, 000 has a 5 percent subcontracting requirement, then $5, 000
of that award must go to preferred firms. In this paper, I study how these subcontracting
policies affect procurement outcomes.
A key feature of subcontracting requirements is that they require prime contractors to
complete more of their projects with subcontractors from a common set of disadvantaged
firms. I use a procurement auction model with endogenous subcontracting to show that
this feature can mitigate cost increases associated with using more costly subcontractors.
In the model, prime contractors can complete projects by using a mix of private resources
and subcontractors from a shared pool of disadvantaged firms. I derive a prime contractor’s
bid in this environment as a strategic markup over its project costs, where the markup
increases as prime contractors use more of their own private resources. With subcontracting
requirements, prime contractors use less of their private resources and more disadvantaged
subcontractors, which lowers the amount of private information prime contractors have on
their own project costs. Prime contractors, therefore, reduce their markups in their bids.
The main finding in my paper is that the reduction in markups can be sufficiently high to
leave the cost of procurement virtually unchanged, even if the additional subcontracting
increases project costs.
I estimate an empirical version of the model with administrative highway procurement
auction data from the New Mexico Department of Transportation (NMDOT) in order to
evaluate their Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) Program. This program relies
on subcontracting requirements to increase the representation of small businesses owned
and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals – who are primarily
2For a full breakdown of small business spending across federal departments,
see the FY 2013 Small Business Goaling Report using the following website:
https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng cms/index.php/en/reports/63-small-business-goaling-report.html.
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ethnic minorities and women – on federal procurement projects. I find that New Mexico’s
past subcontracting requirements are responsible for a 12.7 percent increase in the amount
of money awarded to DBE subcontractors yet only increased procurement costs by 0.3
percent. These results suggest that New Mexico’s subcontracting requirements were not
responsible for large increases in procurement costs.
I then use the model to compare subcontracting requirements with two alternative policies
geared towards increasing DBE participation: a quota and a subsidy. I implement the
quota by removing prime contractors’ rights to subcontract below the DBE subcontracting
requirement, which is currently possible under New Mexico’s program; I design the subsidy
as a payment from the NMDOT to prime contractors proportional to their DBE utiliza-
tion. My analysis of these two policies reveals that New Mexico can achieve the same level
of DBE participation at even lower costs of procurement with subsidies relative to subcon-
tracting requirements and quotas. This outcome is a consequence of subsidies distorting the
subcontracting decisions of low project cost prime contractors less than the other policies.
At the level of DBE participation achieved under New Mexico’s current subcontracting
requirements, quotas result in larger amounts of money awarded to DBE subcontractors
relative to the other policies. These results imply that quotas are best for governments
seeking to increase DBE awards, while subsidies are best for governments aiming to reduce
procurement costs.
My paper fits into the literature on subcontracting and how it affects firms and auction
outcomes. Jeziorski and Krasnokutskaya (2016) study subcontracting in a dynamic pro-
curement auction, and their model is closely related to the model in my paper. The main
difference between their model and mine is that I study how different subcontracting poli-
cies affect bidding and DBE subcontracting in a static setting. These policies are frequently
used in government procurement and can lead to a variety of different procurement out-
comes. Additionally, their empirical application relies on calibrated parameters, whereas
my empirical model allows me to identify and estimate all of its primitives. Other studies of
3
subcontracting include Marion (2015) who looks at the effect of horizontal subcontracting
on firm bidding strategies, Miller (2014) who explores the effect of incomplete contracts on
subcontracting in public procurement, Nakabayashi and Watanabe (2010) who use labora-
tory experiments to investigate subcontract auctions, Branzoli and Decarolis (2015) who
study how different auction formats affect entry and subcontracting choices, Moretti and
Valbonesi (2012) who use Italian data to determine the effects of subcontracting by choice as
opposed to subcontracting by law, and De Silva et al. (2016) who study how subcontracting
affects the survival of firms competing for road construction projects.
There are additional papers within the subcontracting literature that focus on the relation-
ship between prime contractors and their subcontractors and suppliers. In construction, Gil
and Marion (2013) study how the relationships between prime contractors and their subcon-
tractors shape firm entry and pricing decisions. Papers in other industries include Kellogg
(2011), Masten (1984), and Joskow (1987). My paper abstracts away from many of these
more dynamic relationship issues and focuses on a firm’s static incentive to subcontract
with disadvantaged firms.
My paper’s empirical application to DBE subcontracting requirements complements the
literature on subcontracting-based affirmative action policies in government procurement.
De Silva et al. (2012) also study DBE subcontracting requirements and find that DBE
subcontracting requirements have negligible effects on a firm’s cost of completing asphalt
projects in Texas. I extend their work by considering how prime contractors allocate shares
of a project to DBE subcontractors and how subcontracting requirements alter those de-
cisions. Marion (2009, 2017) uses changes in DBE procurement policies to identify the
effects of DBE programs on outcomes such as procurement costs and DBE utilization. My
approach differs in that I use a model to back out a firm’s cost components. The estimated
cost components allow me to compare outcomes across a broad range of counterfactual
subcontracting policies. Additional studies on the effects of these affirmative action policies
include De Silva et al. (2015) who find that affirmative action programs can generate sub-
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stantial savings for the government and Marion (2011) who studies the effects of affirmative
action programs on DBE utilization in California.
There are a variety of recent studies on similar preference programs in government procure-
ment. Athey et al. (2013) study set-asides and subsidies for small businesses in US Forest
Service timber auctions. They find that set-asides reduce efficiency and that a subsidy to
small businesses is a more effective way to achieve distributional objectives. My results on
quotas and subsidies for disadvantaged subcontractors are similar in that I find that sub-
sidies are generally less costly for the government relative to quotas. Nakabayashi (2013)
investigates set-asides for small and medium enterprises in Japanese public construction
projects and finds that enough of these smaller enterprises would exit the procurement
market in the absence of set-asides to increase the overall cost of procurement. Empirical
papers on bid discounting, which is yet another type of preference program, include Kras-
nokutskaya and Seim (2011) and Marion (2007) who study a bid discount program for small
businesses in California and Rosa (2016) who investigates bid discounts for residents in New
Mexico. Hubbard and Paarsch (2009) use numerical simulations to explore how discounts
affect equilibrium bidding.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.3 describes the NMDOT’s pro-
curement process and DBE Program. Section 2.4 shows how I model bidding and DBE
subcontracting, and section 1.5 contains a numerical example from my model. Section 1.6
shows how I estimate an empirical version of the model, while section 1.7 contains my
descriptive analysis and estimation results. Section 2.9 presents my counterfactual simula-
tions; section 2.10 concludes.
1.3. New Mexico Highway Procurement
This section describes how the NMDOT awards its construction projects, how the NM-
DOT’s current DBE Program operates, and how prime contractors solicit goods and services
from DBE subcontractors. The contents of this section provide the institutional details that
5
guide my modeling choices in later sections.
1.3.1. Letting
The NMDOT advertises new construction projects four weeks prior to the date of bid
opening. As part of the advertising process, the NMDOT summarizes each project’s main
requirements in an Invitation for Bids (IFB) document. This document contains informa-
tion on each project’s type of work, location, completion deadline, DBE subcontracting
requirements (if applicable), and licensing requirements. I use the information in the IFB
documents to construct my set of project-level observables.
Interested firms then request the full set of contract documents from the NMDOT and
write a proposal for the completion of each project. In the contract documents, the NMDOT
provides firms with an engineer-estimated cost of the project, which I refer to as the project’s
engineer’s estimate. I include the engineer’s estimates as an additional variable in my set of
project-level observables. The contract proposals contain a plan for completing the required
work, which includes a list of all firms used as subcontractors and a price for completing
each required task. I use data compiled by the NMDOT from the contract documents on
the winning firm’s DBE subcontractors to calculate the share of work allocated to DBE
firms.
Firms submit their proposals to the NMDOT through a secure website prior to the date of
bid opening. On the date of bid opening, the NMDOT evaluates all proposals and selects
the firm that offers the lowest total price on all tasks as the winner.3 I model this process
as a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction.
3The NMDOT can reject the lowest bid if the lowest bidding firm fails to meet DBE subcontract-
ing requirements or quality standards. For a more detailed description of the circumstances where the
NMDOT will reject a low bid, see the NMDOT’s Consultant Services Procedures Manual available at
http://dot.state.nm.us/en/Program Management.html.
6
1.3.2. DBE Certification and Subcontracting Requirements
To qualify as a DBE, a firm must show the NMDOT that it is a small business owned and
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, who are primarily ethnic
minorities and women. Ownership requires that at least 51 percent of the firm be owned by
these disadvantaged individuals, while control generally requires that disadvantaged indi-
viduals have the power to influence the firm’s choices. The Small Business Administration,
which is the federal agency that supports and manages small business programs, determines
whether a firm qualifies as a small business in a particular industry by considering economic
characteristics such as the size of the firm relative to the industry’s average firm size. As
part of the certification process, the NMDOT visits the offices and job sites of DBE ap-
plicants to verify their information. The NMDOT will also routinely check certified DBEs
to ensure that they meet the eligibility requirements. Firms that attempt to participate in
the DBE Program based on false information can be subject to administrative fines and
suspension from federal contracting. There are a total of 235 qualified DBE firms as of
April 2016.4
As a recipient of federal funds, the NMDOT is also required to set an overall state goal
for the utilization of qualified DBE firms on federally assisted construction contracts. The
state expresses its DBE utilization goal as a percentage of total federal funds it awards to
DBE firms and has historically been between 7 and 9 percent. If the NMDOT suspects
that DBE utilization will fall short of the overall state goal due to either unanticipated
levels of contracts, unforeseen types of contracts, or corrigible deficiencies in the utilization
of DBE firms, the NMDOT can set subcontracting requirements on individual projects,
which, similar to the state goal, requires that prime contractors allocate a pre-specified
percentage of the total award amount to DBE subcontractors.
In setting these requirements on individual contracts, the NMDOT takes a number of factors
4For additional information on the NMDOT’s DBE Program, see the DBE Program Manual available at
http://dot.state.nm.us/en/OEOP.html#c.
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into consideration. In particular, the NMDOT bases their DBE subcontracting requirements
on the type of work involved on a project, the project’s location, and the availability of
DBE subcontractors to perform the type of work requested on a project. Additionally, the
NMDOT will only consider projects with both subcontracting opportunities and estimated
costs of more than $300, 000 eligible for DBE subcontracting requirements. Since those
projects are the only ones eligible for subcontracting requirements, much of my empirical
and counterfactual analysis focuses on those larger projects.
Once established, the NMDOT gives prime contractors a number of incentives to meet a
project’s subcontracting requirement. Although the requirement is not a binding quota,
contractors who fall short of the requirement incur additional costs in the form of showing
satisfactory effort to use DBE subcontractors to the NMDOT. Moreover, a prime contractor
that fails to meet a project’s requirement can be fined according to the difference between
the established goal and the achieved level of DBE participation. I model these costs as
fines paid by prime contractors who miss the subcontracting requirement.
1.3.3. Subcontracting with DBE Firms
New Mexico maintains an online DBE system that is accessible to all governments and
contractors. Through this system, prime contractors can find potential DBE subcontrac-
tors and request competitive quotes for each part of a project that requires subcontracting.
DBE firms selected as subcontractors have the value of their services count towards the sub-
contracting requirement provided that they are performing a commercially useful function.
Given that the DBE system is accessible to all governments and contractors, it is likely that
there are similarities in the cost of using DBE subcontractors across firms.
In the model, I represent the cost of using DBE subcontractors with an upward-sloping
pricing function common to all prime contractors. Unfortunately, the New Mexico data
does not keep track of the subcontractors used by bidders who do not win, so I cannot
directly test whether DBE subcontractor utilization is common with the data. In other
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states that have similar DBE systems and that keep public records of DBE commitments
on projects with subcontracting requirements, bidders rarely use different firms in satisfying
the DBE subcontracting requirement. In a sample of lettings from Iowa, for example, 82.4
percent of lettings with subcontracting requirements and more than one bid had overlap in
DBE subcontractors.5 The advantage of using New Mexico over these states is that I also
have data on DBE commitments without subcontracting requirements. This data variation
allows me to separately identify all of my model’s primitives.
In the data, the use of DBE firms as subcontractors is prevalent – even when a project does
not have a DBE subcontracting requirement. In particular, 78 percent of all contracts use
at least one DBE subcontractor and 62 percent of contracts without a DBE subcontracting
requirement use at least one DBE subcontractor. DBE subcontractors account for a total
of 7.1 percent of all contract dollars awarded by the NMDOT.
1.4. Theoretical Model
In this section, I develop a theoretical model that formalizes the different channels through
which DBE subcontracting requirements affect a prime contractor’s bidding and DBE sub-
contracting decisions. My model is closely related to the subcontracting model proposed
by Jeziorski and Krasnokutskaya (2016) but adds a policy that encourages the use of DBE
subcontractors.6
For each project, prime contractors decide how much work to give DBE subcontractors
and how much to bid. Prime contractors base their decisions on their non-DBE costs of
completing the entire project, which includes work completed in-house and by non-DBE
5This statistic comes from the Iowa Department of Transportation’s January 2011 letting, which is
available at https://www.bidx.com/ia/letting?lettingid=11%2F01%2F19. Other lettings from Iowa have a
similar pattern.
6Jeziorski and Krasnokutskaya (2016) also include capacity dynamics and entry in their model. In
the data, there is no effect of DBE subcontracting requirements on both the set of planholders, which is
typically used as a measure of the potential number of bidders, and the fraction of planholders that eventually
become bidders. Moreover, different measures of capacity have little influence on both bidding and DBE
subcontractor shares. As a result, the analysis targets bidding and subcontracting strategies rather than
entry and capacity constraints.
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subcontractors. My model also incorporates subcontracting requirements when set by the
NMDOT.
1.4.1. Environment and Objective Function
Formally, N risk-neutral bidders compete against each other for the rights to complete a
single, indivisible highway construction project. Bidders are ex-ante symmetric in that each
bidder draws their cost of completing the entire project without DBE subcontractors, ci,
independently from the same distribution, F , with support on the interval [c, c]. This cost,
which I refer to as a bidder’s non-DBE cost, includes work done by the prime contractor
and non-DBE subcontractors. Bidders know the realization of their own non-DBE cost and
the distribution of non-DBE costs prior to submitting bids.
In addition to the standard setup of a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction, all bidders
can choose to subcontract out portions of their projects to DBE firms. That is to say, bidders
choose a share of the project, si ∈ [0, 1], to subcontract to DBE firms, which reduces their
portion of the cost of completing the project from ci to ci (1− si). I model a bidder’s cost
of using DBE subcontractors as an increasing, convex, and twice continuously differentiable
pricing function P : [0, 1] → R+, which is known to all bidders and maps the share of the
project using DBE subcontractors into a price of using DBE subcontractors.7 The cost of
using a DBE subcontracting share of si is then P (si), and I will now refer to this cost as a
bidder’s DBE cost. A limitation of placing this type of structure on the DBE subcontracting
market is that it assumes away any type of private information that a bidder may have on
using DBE subcontractors. For example, this assumption precludes the possibility that
contractors may form relationships with certain DBE subcontracting firms to get discounts
on prospective construction projects relative to other contractors. Instead, each bidder has
access to the same DBE subcontracting technology.
7This pricing function represents the prices received by prime contractors from DBE subcontractors
through the quote solicitation process. Ideally, I would model the DBE subcontracting market separately,
and the price would be an endogenous outcome of that market. However, since the data only contains
information on the prices listed by DBE subcontractors, I can only use prices to infer the cost of using DBE
subcontractors. For a discussion of the microfoundations of P , see Appendix A.1.2.
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Some of the NMDOT’s highway construction projects are subject to DBE subcontracting
requirements. Namely, for every prospective highway construction project, the NMDOT
specifies a total share of the project, s ∈ [0, 1], that is to be completed by DBE subcontrac-
tors, and this DBE subcontracting requirement is known to all bidders prior to any bidding
or DBE subcontracting decisions. A choice of s = 0 in this environment is analogous to not
having a subcontracting requirement.
I assume that the NMDOT enforces their subcontracting requirements through fines. These
fines represent any additional costs to bidders who miss the subcontracting requirement,
including any actual fines, the increased probability of bid rejection, and any additional ef-
fort required to show the NMDOT satisfactory effort to use DBE subcontractors. Formally,
subcontracting requirements alters a bidder’s optimal choice of DBE subcontracting and
bidding through a fine function ϕ : [0, 1] → R+, which is common knowledge and maps a
bidder’s choice of DBE subcontracting given the DBE subcontracting requirement into a
non-negative value. For technical reasons, I assume that ϕ is non-increasing, convex, and
continuously differentiable in all of its arguments.
In sum, a bidder’s optimization problem is
max
{bi,si}
(bi − ci (1− si)− P (si)− ϕ (si; s))× Pr (bi < bj∀j ∈ N \ {i}) . (1.1)
A strategy in this environment is a 2-tuple that consists of a bid function bi : [c, c] → R+
and a DBE subcontracting share function si : [c, c] → [0, 1], which, for all levels of s,
maps non-DBE costs into bidding and DBE subcontracting choices. In order to reduce
the problem’s complexity, I focus on symmetric Nash equilibria in bidding and DBE sub-
contracting; therefore, I drop the i subscript from the bidding and DBE subcontracting
strategies without loss of generality.
The DBE subcontracting market introduces a couple of interesting changes into the com-
petitive bidding environment. Perhaps the most salient of these changes is that the DBE
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subcontracting market allows all bidders to substitute between completing projects with
non-DBE resources and with DBE subcontractors. This substitution benefits the bidders
in that increasing the DBE subcontracting share reduces their non-DBE portion of the cost
of completing the contract; however, this substitution is costly in that it requires bidders
to give up a portion of their profits to their DBE subcontractors. Another notable change
is that DBE subcontracting creates a shared component in bidders’ costs of completing the
entire project, since all bidders have equal access to DBE subcontracting.
1.4.2. DBE Subcontracting Strategies
I begin my analysis of bidding and DBE subcontracting behavior by solving for the optimal
DBE subcontracting share given a non-DBE cost realization and a DBE subcontracting
requirement. I use the first-order conditions to characterize an optimal DBE subcontracting
share s (ci; s). My analysis of the second-order conditions is contained in the appendix; see
Appendix A.1.1. For an interior choice of s (ci; s), the first-order conditions require that
ci = P
′ (si) + ϕ′ (si; s) . (1.2)
For bidders whose optimal choice is to use no DBE subcontractors, the following condition
must hold:
ci < P
′ (0) + ϕ′ (0; s) . (1.3)
Likewise, bidders whose optimal choice is to subcontract the entire project to DBE firms
must have the following condition hold:
ci > P
′ (1) + ϕ′ (1; s) . (1.4)
There are a couple of key properties of optimal DBE subcontracting. Similar to Jeziorski
and Krasnokutskaya (2016), the optimal DBE subcontracting decision does not depend on
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the probability of winning the auction. Intuitively, subcontracting only affects a bidder’s
objective function through the payoff conditional on winning and does not directly affect
the probability of winning. Bidders, therefore, do not take the probability of winning into
account when deciding how to use DBE subcontractors. Another characteristic of optimal
DBE subcontracting is that the optimal share does not depend on the bid. In this sense,
one can reinterpret the optimal decisions of a bidder as follows: upon the realization of ci,
bidders first determine how much of the project to subcontract out to DBE firms; then,
bidders determine how much to bid given their optimal choice of si.
Before moving into the bidding strategies, note the effect of DBE subcontracting require-
ments on DBE subcontracting decisions. With an interior choice of s (ci; s), assigning a
positive DBE subcontracting requirement on a project only affects the DBE subcontractor
choice through the marginal fine rather than the fine’s value. From a policy perspective,
bidders are more likely to change their subcontracting behavior if ϕ changes rapidly in si,
implying that policies that impose larger marginal fines for missing the DBE subcontracting
requirement are more effective in changing equilibrium DBE subcontracting shares.
1.4.3. Bidding Strategies
In addition to selecting a DBE subcontracting share, bidders must also decide on how to
bid. To characterize that decision, I first separate a bidder’s non-DBE cost of completing
the project from its total cost of completing the project, which I will now refer to as its
project cost. A bidder’s project cost consists of its non-DBE cost, its DBE costs, and any
fines.8 Formally, I define a bidder’s project cost as
φ (ci; s) = ci (1− s (ci; s)) + P (s (ci; s)) + ϕ (s (ci; s) ; s) .
8Recall that one can calculate optimal subcontracting independently of the bid. Therefore, the project
cost can be found prior to bidding and can be substituted in the objective function, obviating the need to
optimize over si.
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Substituting φ into equation (1.1) and removing the optimization over si reduces the prob-
lem to a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction, where bidders draw a project cost rather
than a non-DBE cost. This transformed optimization problem together with boundary con-
dition b
(
φ
)
= φ has a unique solution that is increasing in φ, given arguments from Reny
and Zamir (2004), Athey (2001) and Lebrun (2006).9 As a result, I focus on symmetric
bidding strategies that are increasing in φ.
There is a tight relationship between a bidder’s project cost and a bidder’s non-DBE cost.
In particular, observe that
φ′ (ci; s) = (1− s (ci; s)) ≥ 0, (1.5)
where the above inequality uses the first-order conditions on DBE subcontracting to elim-
inate the extra terms in the derivative. Equation (1.5) demonstrates that the project cost
is increasing in ci whenever s (ci; s) ∈ [0, 1) and flat whenever s (ci; s) = 1. Intuitively, bid-
ders with lower non-DBE costs should also have lower project costs unless their non-DBE
costs are high enough that it is optimal to subcontract the entire project to DBE firms.
Furthermore, this relationship implies that the bid function is increasing in ci, except when
s (ci; s) = 1.
Using an envelope theorem argument based on Milgrom and Segal (2002) and equation (1.5),
I derive an expression for the optimal bid function in terms of non-DBE costs. Proposition 1
presents the bid function expression, with the details of its derivation contained in Appendix
A.1.1.10
Proposition 1. The optimal bid function is
9Observe that φ = P (1) + ϕ (1; s) is the project cost of a bidder that subcontracts the entire project to
DBE firms. I derive this expression from the previous result that the optimal DBE subcontracting share is
increasing in ci.
10The NMDOT does not use reservation prices in its procurement auctions, so my model does not include
a reservation price. The absence of reservation prices can potentially be problematic, though: when there
is only one bidder in an auction, the lack of competition could give rise to unusually high equilibrium
bids. To address this problem, I follow Li and Zheng (2009) in assuming that auctions with one bidder
face additional competition from the NMDOT in the form of an additional bidder during the structural
estimation and counterfactual policy simulations. This assumption approximates the right of the NMDOT
to reject high winning bids. In the data, only 4.6 percent of all auctions have one bidder.
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b (ci; s) =
∫ c
ci
(1− s (c˜; s)) (1− F (c˜))N−1 dc˜
(1− F (ci))N−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Markup
+ ci (1− s (ci; s)) + P (s (ci; s)) + ϕ (s (ci; s) ; s)︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
Project Cost
(1.6)
There are a couple of key features of the bid function. In particular, one can interpret
the optimal bid function as a strategic markup11 over project costs. An increase in DBE
subcontracting necessarily reduces a bidder’s markup and total non-DBE costs. Moreover,
the fine function appears as an additive term in the bid function, meaning that bidders pass
fines through to their bids.
1.4.4. The Role of DBE Subcontracting Requirements
Subcontracting requirements can introduce several interesting changes in equilibrium bid-
ding and DBE subcontracting, which come from the features of the equilibrium bid and
DBE subcontracting functions. I summarize those changes in the next proposition and
corollaries and provide the proofs of each statement in Appendix A.1.1.
Proposition 2. For a given non-DBE cost draw ci, if s (ci; 0) 6= s (ci; s), then s (ci; 0) <
s (ci; s).
Proposition 2 says that when the policy can affect a bidder’s DBE subcontracting, subcon-
tracting requirements will increase the share of work given to DBE subcontractors. The
idea behind the proof is that prime contractors want to increase the share of work given to
DBE subcontractors to avoid incurring any fines. Therefore, prime contractors will increase
the share of work given to DBE subcontractors when DBE subcontractors are sufficiently
low priced. The next corollary addresses how subcontracting requirements affect project
costs.
11Technically, the markup term contains the bidder’s markup and the markups of all non-DBE subcon-
tractors. I will continue to refer to this term as the markup where this distinction does not cause confusion.
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Corollary 1. DBE subcontracting requirements weakly raise project costs.
The intuition behind corollary 1 is that, in the absence of DBE subcontracting requirements,
bidders will choose their share of DBE subcontractors to extract the highest possible profits,
which in this case is analogous to minimizing their project costs. As shown in proposition
2, subcontracting requirements can change DBE subcontracting decisions, and that change
leads to higher project costs. The next corollary ties DBE subcontracting requirements to
a bidder’s markup.
Corollary 2. DBE subcontracting requirements weakly lower markups.
The proof of corollary 2 relies on propositions 1 and 2. In particular, the expression for
the optimal bid function in proposition 1 implies that an increase in DBE subcontracting
reduces the bidder’s markup, while proposition 2 shows that DBE subcontracting require-
ments (weakly) increase total DBE subcontracting. From those two propositions, it imme-
diately follows that DBE subcontracting requirements weakly lower markups. Intuitively,
subcontracting requirements distort a bidder’s DBE subcontracting decisions towards com-
pleting a project with more DBE subcontractors and less non-DBE resources. Since bidders
can only markup components of their costs that are private and the cost of DBE subcon-
tractors is common, that distortion leads to a reduction in markups.
1.5. Numerical Example
In this section, I turn to a numerical example to illustrate the main points of the theory.
For this example, I assume that two prime contractors (N = 2) are competing for a single
construction project. I assume that the prime contractors’ non-DBE costs are distributed
uniformly on the interval [0, 1]. For simplicity, I assume that the pricing functions and the
fine function are quadratic and that prime contractors are only fined if their total share of
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work going to DBE subcontractors is below the subcontracting requirement:
P (si; ) =
ξs2i
2
ϕ (si; s) =

λ(si−s)2
2 if si < s
0 if si ≥ s
,
where ξ and λ are coefficients that control the steepness of the pricing and fine functions
respectively. To keep this example simple, I set ξ = 2; I set the fine coefficient, λ, to
3 so that the fine is sufficiently steep to visibly change subcontracting behavior. I use a
subcontracting requirement of 30 percent (s = 0.3) when it applies. Figure 1 contains plots
of the pricing function and the fine function.
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Figure 1: DBE Pricing and Fine Functions
I begin my analysis by first solving for the optimal DBE subcontracting share as a function
of non-DBE costs. To highlight the effects of subcontracting requirements, I perform this
calculation twice: once when there is a requirement and once where there is no requirement.
Figure 2 contains plots of these functions.
Subcontracting requirements lead to a couple of interesting changes to DBE subcontracting
behavior. In particular, subcontracting requirements increase the share of work allocated
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Figure 2: DBE Share Function
to DBE subcontractors for prime contractors with lower non-DBE cost draws and leaves
shares unchanged for prime contractors with higher non-DBE cost draws, which is consistent
with proposition 2. Intuitively, prime contractors with lower non-DBE cost draws find it
more profitable to use non-DBE resources instead of the relatively more expensive DBE
subcontractors. The fine gives these contractors an extra incentive to increase their DBE
shares, which is why DBE subcontracting is higher for them when there is a requirement.
Prime contractors with higher non-DBE costs are more inclined to use DBE subcontractors
to lower their project costs and may even subcontract above and beyond the requirement.
When prime contractors do subcontract above the requirement, the fine is no longer effective,
so there is no change in DBE subcontracting behavior.
Given the solutions for optimal DBE subcontracting, I next analyze equilibrium bidding
with and without the subcontracting requirement. Specifically, I use equation (1.6) to ob-
tain a solution for the equilibrium bids given the uniform assumption on non-DBE costs
and the functional forms for the DBE pricing function and the fine function. I plot these
functions in figure 3. A striking feature of the bid functions is that bids are virtually
unchanged with subcontracting requirements relative to without subcontracting require-
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ments, even when prime contractors draw low non-DBE costs. For this range of non-DBE
cost draws, the reduction in markups is sufficiently high to mitigate the cost of using more
DBE subcontractors. Also note that firms that would subcontract beyond the requirement
do not change their bidding behavior, which is why the bid functions overlap.
Taken together, the simulations demonstrate that subcontracting requirements can increase
the share of work allocated to DBE subcontractors without substantially changing final
cost of procurement. The requirement mainly affects prime contractors with low non-DBE
costs, causing them to increase their usage of DBE subcontractors. With sufficiently high
markups, increased DBE subcontracting only slightly changes optimal bidding, implying
small changes in procurement costs.
1.6. Empirical Model and Estimation
Although the theoretical model can account for a number of different ways in which sub-
contracting requirements can affect bidding and DBE subcontracting, it cannot be applied
to the New Mexico data without additional assumptions on the model’s primitives. In this
section, I outline those assumptions and provide a description of the estimation procedure. I
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end this section by discussing the sources of variation in the data that identify the empirical
model’s parameters.
1.6.1. Parametric Assumptions
To account for a rich set of observed project characteristics while avoiding the curse of
dimensionality, I estimate a parametric version of the simplified model. I assume that a
project, indexed by w, is uniquely determined by the vector (xw, zw, sw, uw, Nw), where sw
is the DBE subcontracting requirement, xw and zw are potentially overlapping vectors of the
remaining project-level observables that affect non-DBE costs and DBE pricing respectively,
uw is a project characteristic unobservable by the econometrician but observable to the
bidders that affects DBE pricing, and Nw is the number of bidders on a project.
I use the project characteristic uw to represent unobserved conditions in the DBE subcon-
tracting market, such as the availability of DBE firms to act as subcontractors and the
concentration of DBE subcontractors in a particular area. Given that the NMDOT may
have extra information on these unobservable characteristics when establishing a DBE sub-
contracting requirement, I allow uw to depend on sw. Specifically, I assume the distribution
of uw follows a gamma distribution with a shape parameter of 1 and a scale parameter of
σu = exp (σu0 + σu1DBE req), where DBE req = sw × 100.
I also parameterize the non-DBE cost distribution so that it is consistent with the theory.
In particular, I assume that non-DBE costs follow a truncated log-normal distribution:
ci ∼ T LN
(
ψ′xw, σ2c , cw | xw
)
,
where ψ is a vector of structural parameters that shift the non-DBE cost distribution and
cw is the project-specific upper bound on the non-DBE cost distribution. Given that ci is
log normal, its support is bounded below by 0. I use the variable cw to get the upper limit
of integration when solving for the equilibrium bids in equation (1.6), and I construct cw
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by using the highest bid normalized by the engineer’s estimate in the sample. Specifically,
let xˆw ∈ xw be a project’s engineer’s estimate, and suppose k is the maximum of the ratio
of bids relative to the engineer’s estimate
(
k = max
{
biw
xˆw
})
. Then cw = kxˆw.
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I use parametric functional forms for the pricing and fine functions similar to the ones used
by Jeziorski and Krasnokutskaya (2016). In particular, I assume that the DBE pricing
function and fine function take the following functional forms:
P (si) =
(
α0 + α1si + α2
si
1− si + α
′
3zw + uw
)
sixˆw (1.7)
ϕ (si; sw) =

γ (si − s)2 xˆ if si < s
0, if si ≥ s
. (1.8)
The hyperbolic term in equation (1.7) prevents firms from subcontracting entire projects
to DBE subcontractors. In the data, no firms select a DBE share of 100%, so I use this
functional form to mirror that empirical fact. The scaling by xˆ in P and ϕ ensures that
the problem scales properly, since projects vary in size; the scaling by si in P ensures
that a prime contractor that allocates none of the project to DBE subcontractors does not
have a DBE cost. I use a piecewise functional form in equation (1.8) so that only prime
contractors who fail to meet the DBE subcontracting requirement will ever be fined. It is
important to note, however, that the parameter values must be constrained for the problem
to have desirable properties, such as an interior maximum, an increasing price function, and
a non-increasing fine function for different parameter guesses. I present these constraints in
appendix A.1.3.
12Observe that this upper limit is only valid if the observation in which this ratio is maximized has no
share of the project allocated to DBE subcontractors, since the boundary condition on bids is in terms of
project costs rather than non-DBE costs. While I do not observe the share of the project allocated to DBE
subcontractors for losing bidders, the winning bidder in the auction I use to set k has a DBE share of 0,
which makes this approximation plausible.
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1.6.2. Estimation
Given a set of structural parameters, my empirical model generates unique solutions for
DBE subcontracting shares and equilibrium bids. The final set of structural parameters
are the ones whose predictions are closest to the outcomes observed in the data. I obtain
these parameters with an indirect inference estimator, which matches the parameters from
an auxiliary model estimated with the true data and simulated data.13
I simulate the data in several steps. Given a guess for the structural parameters θ =
(ψ, σc, σu, α0, α1, α2, α3, γ), I first simulate Nw non-DBE costs for each auction. Since bids
are increasing in non-DBE costs, I take the lowest of the Nw non-DBE costs as the non-DBE
cost of the winning bidder. Let W denote the total number of auctions observed in the data
and H the total number of simulations. In total, I select WH non-DBE costs from the∑
wNwH simulated non-DBE costs. Next, I calculate the equilibrium DBE subcontracting
shares using the first-order conditions on DBE subcontracting in equation (1.2). To account
for the corner solutions, I take the maximum of 0 and the DBE shares obtained from solving
the first-order conditions for si; the other corner solution is ruled out by the functional
form of P (si). With the shares calculated, I solve for the equilibrium winning bids using
equation (1.6). This step requires an approximation of the optimal DBE share function,
so I use polynomial approximations obtained by fitting a polynomial on a grid of optimal
DBE shares for each auction.
To then implement the indirect inference estimator, I need to select an auxiliary model.
In general, the auxiliary model should be straightforward to estimate and account for the
endogenous outcomes. The two endogenous outcomes are the equilibrium bids and DBE
subcontracting shares, so I use a linear ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the log-
winning bid and a linear OLS regression of the winning bidder’s DBE subcontracting share
as the two components of my auxiliary model. Specifically, if sw is the share of the project
13Indirect inference was first used by Smith (1993) in a time-series setting and extended by Gourieroux
et al. (1993) to a more general form. I use methods from this extended version in estimating the empirical
model.
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the winning bidder allocates to DBE subcontractors in auction w and bw is the winning
bidder’s bid in auction w, then my auxiliary model for the DBE share and winning bid is
sw =
 xw
sw

′
βs + sw
log(bw) =
 xw
sw

′
βb + bw,
where βs are the parameters of the DBE share regression, βb are the parameters of the
winning bid regression, sw is the error term on the DBE share regression, and bw is the
error term on the winning bid regression.
I use a Wald criterion function to match the true data to the simulated data. The indirect
inference structural parameter estimates, θˆ, are then the solution the following optimization
problem:
min
θ∈Θ
[
βˆW − β˜HW (θ)
]′
ΩˆW
[
βˆW − β˜HW (θ)
]
,
where βˆW are the auxiliary model parameters estimated from the data, β˜HW (θ) are the
auxiliary model parameters estimated from the structural parameters, and ΩˆW is some pos-
itive definite weighting matrix. In practice, I use the indirect inference estimator’s optimal
weight matrix as the weighting matrix, and I use the estimator’s asymptotic distribution
to calculate standard errors. For a detailed explanation of the optimal weight matrix and
standard errors, see Appendix A.1.3.
1.6.3. Parametric Identification
I conclude this section by discussing the variation in the data that identifies the model’s
structural parameters. These parameters are the mean and standard deviation of the non-
DBE cost distribution (ψ and σc), the parameters of the observed components of the DBE
pricing function (α0, α1, α2 and α3), the parameters of the unobserved component of the
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DBE pricing function (σu0 and σu1), and the fine function parameter (γ).
In the data, I observe projects without subcontracting requirements where prime contractors
use no DBE subcontractors. The bids on these projects allow me to identify the non-DBE
cost distribution parameters, since the bid function does not depend on the DBE pricing or
fine functions when there are no DBE subcontractors and no subcontracting requirements.
From there, I can identify the parameters of the observed and unobserved parts of the DBE
pricing function from two types of projects: projects with no subcontracting requirements
and projects with subcontracting requirements where prime contractors exceed the subcon-
tracting requirement. Given the non-DBE cost distribution parameters, the variation in
bids and DBE shares on these projects correspond to changes in the DBE pricing function.
I observe additional variation in bidding and DBE subcontracting between these two types
of projects, and this variation allows me to identify the σu1 parameter – which accounts for
the possibility that the NMDOT assigns subcontracting requirements when it is less costly.
Put differently, if firms tend to use more DBE subcontractors when there is no requirement,
then the model would suggest that the NMDOT uses subcontracting requirements when
DBE subcontractors are more costly.
The last parameter that needs to be identified is the fine parameter, γ. Given the non-DBE
cost distribution parameters and DBE pricing function parameters, I identify γ from the bids
and DBE shares of prime contractors who miss the DBE subcontracting requirement. The
idea here is that fines only affect bids and subcontracting when a prime contractor fails to
reach a given requirement, so the model attributes differences in bidding and subcontracting
between prime contractors who meet and do not meet the requirement to γ.
1.7. Empirical Analysis
In this section, I perform the empirical analysis on the procurement data from New Mexico.
My analysis begins with a description of the data and variables. I then present summary
statistics and descriptive regressions to highlight the bidding and DBE subcontracting pat-
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terns present in the data. Finally, I provide the structural parameter estimates and a
discussion of the model’s fit.
1.7.1. Data Description and Variables
The data contains federally funded highway construction contracts issued by the NMDOT
from 2008 until 2014 for the maintenance and construction of transportation systems. In
order to be consistent with the model, I do not include contracts won by DBE prime con-
tractors.14 I construct the subcontracting portion of the data from administrative records
from New Mexico’s SHARE system. The SHARE data is part of New Mexico’s state-wide
accounting system and tracks all of the transactions between the NMDOT and the contrac-
tors who are ultimately awarded projects using federal aid. This data contains information
on the subcontractors used in each construction project, including each subcontractor’s
DBE status and individual award amount.
I augment the SHARE data with data on contract characteristics. In particular, I include
the competition each winning contractor faces in terms of the actual number of bidders
and the number of bidders who request information about each project, the advertised
DBE subcontracting requirement, the type of work necessary to complete each project,
an engineer’s estimated cost of completing each project, and the expected number of days
needed to complete each project in the set of observable project characteristics. I gather this
data from publicly available NMDOT bidding records, which includes the IFB documents
the NMDOT uses to advertise their projects and spreadsheets containing each project’s
received bids and eligible bidders.
I define the complete set of variables observed in the full data set as follows. DBE share
is the percentage share of the total project awarded to DBE subcontractors. Engineer’s
estimate an engineer’s estimated cost of a project, which is provided by engineers from the
NMDOT. Winning bid is the bid that ultimately wins the procurement auction. Subprojects
14My model assumes that the prime contractor is not a DBE firm, which is the case for the majority of con-
tracts awarded by the NMDOT. Moreover, prime DBE contractors are not affected by DBE subcontracting
requirements, since the prime contractor must perform most of the work.
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are smaller portions of a larger project, which are specified in the IFB documents and are
used as a measure of how easily a contract can use subcontractors.15 Working days are the
number of days a given project is expected to take to complete, and licenses refers to the
number of separate license classifications required to complete the project. Length indicates
the length of the construction project, and DBE req is the level of the DBE subcontracting
requirement. Planholders refers to the number of firms requesting the documents necessary
to submit a bid, and federal highway and urban are indicator variables that take on a value
of one if a project is located on a federal highway or an urban county respectively.
I use additional observables to distinguish a project’s location and the type of work requested
for each project. District is a variable that indicates a project’s administrative district. In
New Mexico, there are a total of six mutually exclusive districts – each serving a different
region of the state. I separate the type of work requested for each project into six different
categories: road work, bridge work, lighting, safety work, stockpiling, and other. I use the
other category as the reference class.
1.7.2. Summary Statistics
Table 12 presents the summary statistics from the entire sample of NMDOT highway con-
struction contracts. I divide projects into four categories: projects with subcontracting
requirements, projects without subcontracting requirements, projects eligible for subcon-
tracting requirements yet do not have any, and the entire sample of projects. Recall that
New Mexico considers all projects estimated to cost more than $300, 000 eligible for sub-
contracting requirements.
Table 12 indicates a couple of differences across projects with and without subcontract-
ing requirements. Projects with subcontracting requirements have, on average, 2.4 more
subprojects and are estimated to cost $1.4 million more than eligible projects without
subcontracting requirements. Also, projects with subcontracting requirements allocate 4.9
percentage points more to DBE subcontractors relative to eligible projects without subcon-
15See Appendix A.1.7 for an example of subprojects.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
With Req. W/o Req. W/o Req. & Eligible Total
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Eng. Estimate (1000s) 5530.86 6682.41 3817.25 6781.04 4120.84 6975.37 4618.99 6780.67
Winning Bid (1000s) 5256.19 6843.40 3438.49 5858.68 3712.46 6019.81 4288.93 6394.94
Bidders 4.64 1.94 4.08 1.93 4.14 1.96 4.34 1.95
Subprojects 9.83 5.12 7.21 4.70 7.47 4.78 8.43 5.07
DBE Share (%) 9.15 7.20 4.25 6.29 4.30 5.77 6.54 7.15
DBE Req. (%) 4.20 1.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.97 2.47
Share-Req. Gap (%) 4.95 6.91 4.25 6.29 4.30 5.77 4.58 6.59
Comply if Req. 0.91 0.29 0.91 0.29
Number of Contracts 182 207 191 389
tracting requirements. Despite these differences, projects with subcontracting requirements
tend to attract a similar number of bidders as eligible projects without subcontracting re-
quirements, and on projects with requirements, many of the prime contractors comply with
the requirement – allocating an average of 5.0 percentage points more than the required
amount to DBE subcontractors.
1.7.3. Descriptive Regressions
In order to explore bidding patterns in the data, I run OLS regressions of the log-winning
bids on the covariates collected from the NMDOT bidding data. Table 2 reports regression
coefficients. The main parameter of interest is the coefficient on the DBE requirement vari-
able, since it shows the correlation between the winning bids and the DBE subcontracting
requirement. Column (1) only controls for the variable of interest and the engineer’s esti-
mate. Column (2) includes additional controls for complexity (length, subprojects, working
days and licensing requirements) and the type of work requested. I capture the competitive
bidding environment in the second column by the number of planholders and the num-
ber of bidders, while I include other control variables such as administrative district (not
displayed in the regression tables), whether a project is in an urban or rural county, and
whether the project takes place on a federal highway to account for a project’s proposed
location. Column (3) adds month and year fixed effects as a control for seasonality. I repeat
these regression specifications in columns (4) - (6) for a sample limited to projects eligible
for DBE subcontracting requirements.
The regressions indicate that the winning bids are uncorrelated with DBE subcontracting
27
Table 2: OLS Regression of the Winning Bids
Dependent variable:
log(Winning Bid)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.982∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.020) (0.020) (0.009) (0.021) (0.021)
DBE Req (%) −0.002 0.002 0.002 −0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
log(Length + 1) 0.021 0.026∗ 0.019 0.023∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
log(Planholders) −0.050 0.014 −0.064 −0.031
(0.044) (0.054) (0.043) (0.047)
log(Subprojects) 0.079∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024)
Licenses Required (#) 0.038∗∗ 0.032∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.039∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
log(Working Days) 0.018 0.012 0.017 0.009
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025)
Bidders −0.024∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Federal Highway 0.006 0.001 0.008 0.004
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Urban −0.054∗ −0.056∗ −0.052∗ −0.048
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
Work/District Controls X X X X
Month/Year FEs X X
Observations 389 389 389 373 373 373
Adjusted R2 0.976 0.980 0.982 0.973 0.979 0.981
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Descriptive OLS regressions of the winning bid on project-level observables. Columns
(1)-(3) use all projects, while columns (4)-(6) only use projects eligible for subcon-
tracting requirements. Standard errors are robust.
requirements: across all specifications, the coefficient on the DBE requirement variable
is small and statistically insignificant.16 These results suggest that DBE subcontracting
requirements are not associated with the ultimate cost of procurement and are comparable
to De Silva et al. (2012) who find a lack of an effect of DBE subcontracting requirements
on asphalt procurement auctions in Texas.
Given that winning bids and DBE subcontracting requirements are uncorrelated, it is rea-
sonable to question whether DBE subcontracting requirements have any impact on DBE
subcontracting. To address this question, I conduct a regression analysis of the percentage
16Observe that these coefficients will be biased if there are unobservable factors that affect both bidding
(later, DBE subcontracting decisions) and the decision of whether to include DBE subcontracting require-
ments on a particular project. While the control variables account for many of the factors used in setting
DBE subcontracting requirements, the possibility of biased regression estimates still remains. My empirical
model explicitly accounts for this type of bias because it allows the subcontracting requirements to affect
the price of using DBE subcontractors through unobservable factors.
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of projects allocated to DBE subcontractors by winning contractors by using the same six
regression specifications as the winning bid regressions. I report the results in table 3.
Table 3: OLS Regressions of the DBE Shares
Dependent variable:
DBE Share (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.240 −0.304 −0.353 0.308 −0.204 −0.139
(0.351) (0.581) (0.622) (0.306) (0.559) (0.530)
DBE Req (%) 1.108∗∗∗ 0.984∗∗∗ 1.016∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.152) (0.183) (0.142) (0.156) (0.182)
log(Length + 1) −0.116 0.017 −0.298 −0.205
(0.506) (0.511) (0.460) (0.459)
log(Planholders) −0.567 1.650 −1.190 1.540
(1.795) (1.940) (1.626) (1.952)
log(Subprojects) 1.946∗∗ 1.412 2.209∗∗ 1.847∗∗
(0.840) (0.870) (0.865) (0.869)
Licenses Required (#) 1.509∗ 1.758∗ 1.060 1.052
(0.905) (0.929) (0.826) (0.785)
log(Working Days) −0.407 −0.606 −0.280 −0.533
(0.608) (0.603) (0.610) (0.608)
Bidders −0.076 −0.060 0.003 −0.011
(0.213) (0.215) (0.197) (0.215)
Federal Highway −0.133 −0.237 0.038 0.009
(0.701) (0.686) (0.698) (0.688)
Urban 2.055∗∗ 1.903∗∗ 1.847∗∗ 1.549∗
(0.934) (0.970) (0.841) (0.871)
Work/District Controls X X X X
Month/Year FEs X X
Observations 389 389 389 373 373 373
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.216 0.229 0.162 0.217 0.235
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Descriptive OLS regressions of the DBE subcontractor share on project-level ob-
servables. Columns (1)-(3) use all projects, while columns (4)-(6) only use projects
eligible for subcontracting requirements. Standard errors are robust.
Unlike the winning bid regressions, DBE subcontracting requirements have a positive and
significant correlation with DBE participation. Increasing the DBE subcontracting require-
ment by one percent increases the share of DBE firms used as subcontractors by about
one percent over the different regression specifications. These results suggest that the DBE
subcontracting requirements, although uncorrelated with the winning bids, are associated
with their goal of increasing the utilization of DBE firms.17
17A property of DBE subcontracting from the model, which is shown in Appendix A.1.1, is that the total
share of work given to DBE subcontractors is non-decreasing in ci. This property can potentially be rejected
by the data if bidders who submit higher bids choose lower DBE subcontracting shares, since bids are also
increasing in ci for s (ci; s) ∈ [0, 1). Although the data cannot directly address this issue, I can test this
property by using bids as a proxy for non-DBE costs in DBE subcontracting regressions. When included
in a DBE subcontracting regression, the coefficient on the submitted bids is positive, suggesting that DBE
subcontracting shares are associated with higher non-DBE costs.
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Evidence that Higher DBE Shares Reduce Markups
My final piece of descriptive evidence addresses how the share of work allocated to DBE
subcontractors relates to firm markups. In the model, increasing the number of competing
bidders affects bids by reducing markups. The share of work given to DBE subcontractors
also reduces markups, so the reduction in bids due to an increase in the number of competing
bidders should be attenuated by the amount of work assigned to DBE subcontractors. In
the reduced form, this attenuation effect will appear in the coefficient of an interaction term
between the number of bidders and the share of work allocated to DBE subcontractors; a
positive coefficient indicates that the share of work given to DBE subcontractors reduces
the loss in markups due to an increased number of competitors.
Table 4: OLS Regressions of the Share-Bidder Interaction
Dependent variable:
log(Winning Bid)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.986∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.020) (0.020) (0.008) (0.021) (0.021)
DBE Share (%) −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Bidders −0.038∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
DBE Share × Bidders 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005)
Proj./Work/Dist. Controls X X X X
Month/Year FEs X X
Observations 389 389 389 373 373 373
Adjusted R2 0.979 0.980 0.982 0.977 0.979 0.981
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Descriptive OLS regressions of the winning bid on project-level observables with
bidder-share interaction terms. Columns (1)-(3) use all projects, while columns (4)-
(6) only use projects eligible for subcontracting requirements. Standard errors are
robust.
To investigate whether there is evidence of this attenuation effect in the data, I perform
regressions of the log-winning bid on the project-level covariates, with an additional control
for the DBE share and an interaction term between the DBE share and the number of
bidders. The regression specifications follow the same format as the winning bid regressions,
and the coefficient of interest here is the coefficient on the interaction term.
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I present the results for the entire sample of winning bids and the winning bids on projects
eligible for DBE subcontracting requirements in table 4. Consistent with the model, there is
a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term across all regression
specifications. Taken together with the negative and statistically significant coefficient on
the number of bidders, these regressions suggest that DBE utilization may work to reduce
markups.
To summarize the main results, the descriptive regressions provide evidence for how DBE
subcontracting requirements affect bidding, how DBE subcontracting requirements affect
the amount of work subcontracted to DBE firms, and how the share of work given to DBE
subcontractors affects firm markups. I find that winning bids are uncorrelated with DBE
subcontracting requirements and that DBE subcontracting requirements are associated with
higher DBE shares. These two results appear to be contradictory given the expected in-
crease in procurement costs associated with using disadvantaged subcontractors, motivating
the need to investigate the channels proposed in the theoretical model. Finally, I find evi-
dence that the share of work given to DBE subcontractors reduces firm markups, which is
consistent with the implications of the model.
1.7.4. Structural Parameter Estimates
Next, I turn to the parameter estimates from the empirical model. I assume that the
distribution of log-non-DBE costs is linear in a project’s engineer’s estimate, complexity,
location, and type of work required with a constant variance. The parameters of the DBE
pricing function follow the functional form outlined in equation (1.7), with the distribution of
the unobserved price shock allowed to depend on the DBE subcontracting requirement and a
control for the number of subprojects. The parameters of the fine function follow equation
(1.8). Since the subcontracting requirement can affect the realization of the unobserved
pricing component, I only use projects eligible for DBE subcontracting requirements in the
data.
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates for the Log-Normal Cost Distribution
Coefficient Standard Error
Constant 0.776 0.278
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.922 0.012
log(Length + 1) 0.041 0.011
log(Planholders) 0.043 0.099
log(Subprojects) 0.080 0.021
Licenses 0.038 0.015
log(Working Days) 0.009 0.012
Federal Highway -0.017 0.014
Urban -0.015 0.020
District 2 -0.069 0.020
District 3 -0.060 0.021
District 4 -0.002 0.028
District 5 -0.044 0.023
District 6 -0.065 0.021
Bridge work -0.007 0.025
Lighting -0.065 0.058
Road Work 0.043 0.028
Safety Work -0.013 0.028
Stockpiling 0.162 0.063
σc 0.261 0.112
Note: Parameter estimates for the mean and stan-
dard deviation of log-costs.
I present the results for the non-DBE cost distribution parameter estimates in table 5. A
firm’s non-DBE cost is affected by a number of observable factors. In particular, I find that
non-DBE costs are heavily influenced by the engineer’s estimate; a one percent increase
in the engineer’s estimate corresponds to a 0.92 percent non-DBE cost increase, and this
coefficient is statistically significant. Although much of a firm’s non-DBE cost is driven by
the engineer’s estimate, other observable project characteristics can influence the mean of
the log-non-DBE cost distribution. For example, a project’s district ranges from decreasing
non-DBE costs by 6.9 percent to 0.2 percent relative to a project that is located in district
1. The effect of the type of work requested on non-DBE costs ranges from decreasing non-
DBE costs by 6.5 percent to increasing non-DBE costs by 19.6 percent relative to projects
classified as other.
The second set of parameter estimates include the parameters of the DBE pricing function
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Table 6: Parameter Estimates for the DBE Pricing and Fine Functions
Coefficient Standard Error
σu
Constant 0.333 0.331
DBE Req (%) -0.186 0.059
Pricing Constant (α0) 0.171 0.120
si (α1) 0.518 0.316
si
1−si (α2) 0.637 0.300
1/Subprojects (α3) 0.122 0.044
Fine Parameter (γ) 7.371 30.477
Note: Parameter estimates for the DBE pric-
ing and fine functions. The standard devia-
tion of DBE pricing shocks is modeled as σu =
exp (σu0 + σu1DBE req), where DBE req is the
level of the DBE subcontracting requirement.
and the fine function. I summarize these estimates in table 6. Higher DBE subcontracting
requirements are associated with lower DBE pricing shocks, implying that the NMDOT
sets these requirements when DBEs are more readily available. The DBE pricing function
parameters imply that – when the level of uw, the number of subprojects, and the level of
the DBE subcontracting requirement are all fixed at their respective means on DBE-eligible
projects – choosing a DBE subcontracting share of 1 percent requires a payment of 1.15
percent of the project’s engineer’s estimate to DBE subcontractors. The parameter of the
fine function, although noisy due to the small number of firms who do not comply with
DBE requirements, implies that the fine associated with missing the DBE subcontracting
requirement by five percent is about 1.8 percent of the project’s engineer’s estimate. For
the average engineer’s estimate on projects with DBE subcontracting requirements, this
fine amounts to about $101, 900.
1.7.5. Model Fit
I evaluate the model’s fit by comparing the predicted DBE shares and winning bids to the
DBE shares and winning bids observed in the data on projects eligible for DBE subcon-
tracting requirements. Figure 4 contains histograms comparing these two outcomes. In
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these histograms, the red lines represent the density of the simulated DBE shares, the blue
lines represent the density of the simulated winning bids, and the black lines represent the
density of the actual DBE shares and bids. I report winning bids in logs for visual clarity.
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Figure 4: DBE Share and Winning Bid Outcome Fit
Note: Histograms of the actual and predicted DBE shares and Winning bids. The black lines
correspond to the densities observed in the data, the red lines correspond to the predicted DBE
share densities, and the blue lines correspond to the predicted winning bid densities.
The model fits the winning bids fairly well but has difficulty replicating some of the dis-
tribution of DBE shares. The model overpredicts DBE shares of zero and underpredicts
DBE shares between 0.05 and 0.10. Given that this region of the DBE share distribution
corresponds to the actual DBE subcontracting requirements, the model appears to have
difficulty fitting the behavior of prime contractors who set their DBE shares as to just meet
the subcontracting requirement.
To then compare how the model fit differs with DBE subcontracting requirements, I calcu-
late the simulated and actual average DBE shares and winning bids for projects with and
without DBE subcontracting requirements. I present the results in table 7. The model mo-
ments match these data moments reasonably well. The model’s average DBE subcontractor
shares are within 0.12 percentage points of the true average DBE subcontractor shares, and
the model’s average winning bids are within $140, 000 of the average winning bids in the
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data.
Table 7: Model Fit
With Req. W/o Req.
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
DBE Share (%) 9.15 9.05 4.30 4.18
Winning Bid (in Millions) 5.26 5.12 3.71 3.76
Note: The predicted and actual average winning bid and average
DBE shares.
1.8. Counterfactual Analysis
I use the model’s parameter estimates to predict counterfactual bidding and DBE subcon-
tracting decisions under a variety of different policy alternatives. I first investigate changes
in New Mexico’s past subcontracting requirements; this exercise allows me to evaluate how
subcontracting requirements affected past procurement outcomes. I then explore other poli-
cies aimed at encouraging the use of DBE subcontractors. In particular, I consider various
quota and subsidy policies and compare their outcomes with the outcomes obtained with
subcontracting requirements. In order to be consistent with the projects that New Mexico
sees fit for government intervention, I only use projects with positive DBE subcontracting
requirements in my analysis.
1.8.1. Counterfactual Subcontracting Requirements
The level of the DBE subcontracting requirements can vary from state to state and will im-
pact how prime contractors use DBE subcontractors. To investigate how different levels of
DBE subcontracting requirements would have affected New Mexico’s procurement auctions,
I simulate a range of different auction outcomes under a variety of different subcontracting
requirements, including an elimination of all subcontracting requirements. My analysis in
this section focuses on percent changes to the existing DBE subcontracting requirements.
This type of policy adjustment is akin to a uniform change in all DBE subcontracting
requirements, with more change given to projects with higher past subcontracting require-
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ments. The reported policy experiments include outcomes from the model simulated under
a 50 percent increase in the DBE subcontracting requirement, no change in the DBE sub-
contracting requirement, a 50 percent decrease in the DBE subcontracting requirement, and
an elimination of all subcontracting requirements.
I report the averages of six auction outcomes for each policy experiment. DBE Share
is the simulated share of work going to DBE subcontractors, while Winning Bid refers
to the simulated winning bid. Project Cost corresponds to the simulated project costs,
and Markup Reduction is the dollar value of the reduction in markups associated with
using DBE subcontractors. Theoretically, the markup reduction outcome coincides with
the expression
∫ c
ci
s(ci)(1−F (c˜))N−1dc˜
(1−F (ci))N−1 . DBE Cost is the portion of the winning bid that is
paid to DBE subcontractors, and Non-DBE Profits is the markup term, which contains the
prime contractor’s and non-DBE subcontractor’s profits.
Table 8: Counterfactual Goal Levels
Increase (50%) Baseline Decrease (50%) Elimination
DBE share (%) 9.68 9.05 8.60 8.42
Winning Bid (in 1000s) 5132.23 5116.78 5106.33 5103.56
Project Cost (in 1000s) 4328.02 4307.12 4292.97 4287.33
Markup Reduction (in 1000s) 108.85 103.39 99.69 96.82
DBE Cost (in 1000s) 354.41 314.10 288.79 278.71
Non-DBE Profits (in 1000s) 804.20 809.66 813.36 816.23
Note: Average auction outcomes for different requirement levels on auctions with DBE subcon-
tracting reqirements. Effective costs are the costs to complete the entire project, which accounts
for DBE subcontracting. Markup reduction is the dollar value of markups non-DBE firms lose
as a result of DBE subcontracting. DBE cost is the average simulated DBE cost, and non-DBE
profits are the profits of the winning prime contractor and its non-DBE subcontractors.
I display the results of the policy experiments in table 8. As a general trend, increasing
the subcontracting requirements decreases non-DBE profits, while the remaining outcomes
increase. To provide some intuition, the increase in the requirements gives prime contractors
an incentive to use more DBE subcontractors, and more DBE subcontractors result in higher
payments to DBE firms. The increased payments lead to higher project costs, lower non-
DBE profits, and higher winning bids. These effects are modest, though, since the fine
function only affects the decisions of prime contractors that would otherwise subcontract
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below the DBE subcontracting requirement. Conversely, DBE subcontracting has a more
pronounced effect on non-DBE profits. At New Mexico’s past requirement levels, DBE
subcontracting reduced average markups by $103, 390 or 11.3 percent.
To evaluate New Mexico’s subcontracting requirement policy, I compare the baseline model’s
predictions to the predictions of the model when there are no DBE subcontracting require-
ments. These simulations predict that New Mexico’s past requirements resulted in a 0.6
percentage point (or 7.5 percent) increase in the average share of work allocated to DBE
subcontractors and a $35, 390 (or 12.7 percent) increase in the average money awarded to
DBE subcontractors. These increases correspond to a $13, 220 (or 0.3 percent) increase in
the average procurement cost and a $6, 570 (or 0.8 percent) decrease in average non-DBE
firm profits.
1.8.2. Counterfactual Quotas
So far, my analysis shows that using fines to enforce DBE subcontracting requirements can
lead to higher DBE subcontracting shares. The fine, however, does not guarantee that
prime contractors fulfill the subcontracting requirements, since prime contractors can miss
the requirement and pay the corresponding fee. In contrast, quotas ensure that prime
contractors meet the requirement and can, therefore, lead to different auction outcomes
relative to fines. To explore how outcomes would change under a quota, I re-simulate the
auctions with the additional constraint that prime contractors must meet the quota, and
for simplicity, I fix the quota level across all simulated auctions.
Table 9: Counterfactual Quota Levels
0% Quota 5% Quota 10% Quota 15% Quota 20% Quota
DBE share (%) 8.42 10.52 13.09 16.28 20.34
Winning Bid (in 1000s) 5103.56 5172.63 5254.43 5353.97 5478.21
Project Cost (in 1000s) 4287.33 4373.41 4476.02 4601.09 4757.13
Markup Reduction (in 1000s) 96.82 113.83 134.64 160.18 191.98
DBE Cost (in 1000s) 278.71 452.30 666.72 926.48 1251.94
Non-DBE Profits (in 1000s) 816.23 799.22 778.41 752.88 721.08
Note: Average auction outcomes for different quota levels on auctions with DBE subcontracting reqire-
ments.
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Table 9 summarizes the outcomes for different quota levels. As expected, quotas lead to
higher average shares of work completed by DBE subcontractors and become more binding
at higher levels, since the average share is closer to the quota level. Similar to subcontracting
requirements enforced by fines, higher quota levels lead to higher winning bids, higher
project costs, and lower non-DBE profits. Quotas appear to be more effective than fines
in increasing DBE participation, though. In fact, a uniform 5 percent quota leads to
higher DBE subcontracting shares than a 50 percent increase in all DBE subcontracting
requirements (which corresponds to an average subcontracting requirement of 6.3 percent).
1.8.3. Counterfactual Subsidies
As an alternative to enforcing subcontracting requirements, the NMDOT can increase DBE
subcontracting shares by subsidizing DBE utilization. To investigate how subsidies would
affect NMDOT procurement auctions, I simulate the auction outcomes under the assump-
tion that the government subsidizes a share of the DBE costs. That is to say, rather than
facing a DBE pricing function of P (si), prime contractors now face a subsidized pricing
function of (1− sub)P (si), where sub ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of the total DBE cost paid by
the government. To track the subsidy’s cost, I include Subsidy Cost and Procurement Cost
as additional outcome variables, where Subsidy Cost is the average cost of the subsidy and
Procurement Cost is the average cost of the subsidy added to the average winning bid.
Table 10: Counterfactual Subsidy Levels
0% Subsidy 5% Subsidy 10% Subsidy 15% Subsidy 20% Subsidy
DBE share (%) 8.42 9.30 10.30 11.42 12.69
Winning Bid (in 1000s) 5103.56 5079.47 5051.96 5020.46 4984.26
Project Cost (in 1000s) 4287.33 4272.35 4255.05 4235.01 4211.69
Markup Reduction (in 1000s) 96.82 105.94 116.15 127.61 140.49
DBE Cost (in 1000s) 278.71 321.52 371.88 431.18 504.16
Non-DBE Profits (in 1000s) 816.23 807.11 796.91 785.44 772.56
Subsidy Cost (in 1000s) 0 16.08 37.19 64.68 100.83
Procurement Cost (in 1000s) 5103.56 5095.54 5089.15 5085.14 5085.09
Note: Average auction outcomes for different subsidy levels on auctions with DBE subcontracting
reqirements.
Table 10 contains the results from the subsidy simulations. As is evident from the table,
subsidies increase the average share of projects awarded to DBE subcontractors but are
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associated with lower winning bids. Intuitively, the subsidy makes DBE subcontractors
cheaper, which encourages prime contractors to use them to obtain lower project costs.
Increased DBE subcontractor utilization also leads to lower markups, and the combination
of lower markups and lower project costs results in lower average equilibrium bids. Subsidies
also lead to lower non-DBE profits, which comes from prime contractors using more DBE
subcontractors instead of either their own resources or non-DBE subcontractors.
A more counterintuitive result with subsidies is that they produce lower average procure-
ment costs. This outcome is possible because subsidies are less likely to affect the most
efficient18 prime contractor’s DBE subcontracting decisions yet make every competing firm
more competitive. To illustrate this point with an example, consider a firm that is so effi-
cient that it would never use DBE subcontractors – even with the subsidy. If that firm wins,
there would be no subsidy cost, but the firm would have to lower its markup to compete
with the other firms that can now obtain lower project costs with the subsidy.19
1.8.4. Comparing Quotas and Subsidies
With the set of outcomes established for different quota and subsidy levels, I now shift
my analysis towards comparing these policies. In particular, I compare outcomes under a
subsidy and a quota constrained to match the average DBE share obtained by the past
subcontracting requirements. I calculate these subsidy and quota levels by using cubic
splines to interpolate the non-simulated outcomes.
Table 11 contains the policy comparisons. In general, many of the outcomes under subsi-
dies and quotas are similar to the outcomes with subcontracting requirements. Subsidies
result in lower winning bids, higher non-DBE profits, and lower procurement costs rela-
tive to subcontracting requirements, but subsidies also result in lower payments to DBE
subcontractors. These results are intuitive, since subsidies distort more efficient prime con-
tractors’ DBE subcontracting decisions less than subcontracting requirements do, and more
18Efficiency refers to a prime contractor’s non-DBE cost. A more efficient prime contractor has a lower
non-DBE cost.
19I explore this result using simulations in the appendix; see appendix A.1.6.
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Table 11: Policy Comparisons
Quota Subsidy
∆ Winning Bid (%) 0.156 -0.595
∆ DBE Cost (%) 5.187 -1.585
∆ Non-DBE Profits (%) 0.178 0.005
∆ Procurement Cost (%) 0.156 -0.375
Note: Percent change in the average auction out-
comes for policies that achieve the baseline average
DBE subcontracting share.
efficient prime contractors are more likely to win. Relative to subcontracting requirements
and subsidies, quotas lead to higher payments to DBE subcontractors because prime con-
tractors must use the specified share of DBEs instead of paying the fine or not using the
subsidy, even if DBEs are unusually more costly. Taken together, these results suggest that
quotas are appropriate for governments aiming to increase the amount of money given to
DBE subcontractors, while subsidies are best for governments pursuing policies with lower
procurement costs.
1.9. Conclusion
This paper theoretically and empirically examines how subcontracting requirements affect
government procurement auctions. The subcontracting policy requires that prime contrac-
tors select subcontractors from a common pool of preferred firms, leading to a shared com-
ponent in their project costs. Theoretically, this shared cost component reduces markups,
and the reduction in markups can be sufficiently high to mitigate cost increases from using
more costly subcontractors.
The policy experiments illustrate the impact of subcontracting requirements on procurement
in New Mexico. I estimate that New Mexico’s past subcontracting requirements increased
the money given to DBE subcontractors by 12.7 percent, increased procurement costs by
only 0.3 percent, and decreased non-DBE profits by only 0.8 percent. These results sug-
gest that New Mexico’s subcontracting requirements, although effective in increasing DBE
subcontractor utilization, was not responsible for large increases in procurement costs.
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CHAPTER 2 : Resident Bid Preference, Affiliation, and Procurement Competition:
Evidence from New Mexico
2.1. Abstract
In public procurement auctions, governments routinely offer preferences to qualified firms
in the form of bid discounts. Previous studies on bid discounts do not account for affiliation
– a form of cost dependence between bidders that is likely to occur in a public procurement
setting. Utilizing data from the New Mexico Department of Transportation’s Resident
Preference Program, this paper uses an empirical model of firm bidding and entry behavior
to investigate the effect of affiliation on auctions with bid discounting. I find evidence that
firms have affiliated project-completion costs and show how this type of affiliation changes
preference auction outcomes.
2.2. Introduction
Procurement auctions are widely used by governments as a means of securing goods and
services for the lowest possible price. Internationally, government procurement accounts
for anywhere from 10 to 25 percent of GDP, and in the United States alone, government
spending on goods and services accounted for 15.2 percent of GDP in 2013, totaling $2.55
trillion.1 In these procurement auctions, governments routinely offer preferential treatment
to a certain subset of bidders. This treatment often takes the form of bid discounting
– a policy where the government will lower the bids of preferred bidders for comparison
purposes and pay the full asking price upon winning. These preferential policies can affect
auction outcomes and have been studied extensively in the literature.2
In many cases, the purpose of offering these preference programs is to encourage the partic-
ipation of a particular type of bidder. For example, California offers a bid discount to small
1These numbers are taken from the World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts
data files.
2See Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Marion (2007), and Hubbard and Paarsch (2009) for papers
discussing bid discounting.
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businesses to encourage these business to bid on larger projects, and the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank offers a bid discount to domestic firms to encourage domestic development.
The total effect of these programs, however, has been shown to be ambiguous. Although
offering bid discounts can encourage preferred bidders to bid less aggressively, which means
they bid further from their costs, bid discounts also encourage non-preferred bidders to
bid more aggressively, or closer to their costs, and can increase competition and discourage
non-preferred participation. This type of trade-off is highlighted in McAfee and McMillan
(1989) where the authors show that the government can minimize procurement costs by
choosing an optimal discount level when participation is fixed and in Corns and Schotter
(1999) where the authors use experiments to show that preferences can lead to increases in
both cost effectiveness and the representation of preferred bidders.3 Krasnokutskaya and
Seim (2011) show that the magnitudes of these effects are altered when participation is
endogenous.
Another potential factor in evaluating these programs is the possibility of affiliation, or
dependence, between a firm’s cost of completing a project, which I will now call its project
cost, and the project costs of its competitors. These costs are private information, and the
literature has typically taken them to be independent, which implies that a firm that learns
its own project cost has no additional information on the project costs of other bidders.
There are a number of reasons why this independence assumption may not hold. For
instance, firms may use the same subcontractors when submitting a bid, so firms sharing
subcontractors should have some form of dependence in their project costs. Firms may also
buy raw materials from the same suppliers, which again can generate dependence in project
costs.
The existence of affiliation can potentially change a number of preference auction outcomes.
For a given number of participants, affiliation makes firms more “similar” in that they are
3Additional studies that show the theoretical implications of granting preference to certain groups of
bidders include Vagstad (1995) who extends the analysis of McAfee and McMillan (1989) to incentive
contracts and Naegelen and Mougeot (1998) who extend the analysis of McAfee and McMillan (1989) to
include objectives concerning the distribution of contracts over preferred and non-preferred bidders.
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more likely to have similar project costs relative to independence. Firms will, therefore,
adjust how they bid, which can change both procurement costs and firm profits conditional
on entry. If a firm’s incentive to participate is influenced by the expected profitability of a
project, then affiliation can also affect the number of favored entrants and auction efficiency.
Consequently, the total effectiveness of these preference programs can hinge on the presence
of affiliation.
This paper contributes to the bid preference literature by allowing firms to have affiliated
private project costs in procurement auctions with bid discounting and endogenous entry.4
Affiliation is a stronger notion of positive correlation, and it captures the idea that firm
project costs may be related to each other. Using copula methods developed by Hubbard,
Li, and Paarsch (2012) and extended by Li and Zhang (2015), I evaluate a bid preference
program favoring resident bidders in New Mexico and show the bias that can arise from
assuming independence.
I collect the data from New Mexico Department of Transportation (NMDOT) highway
construction contracts. New Mexico is one of a few states that offer qualified resident firms
a 5 percent bid discount on state-funded projects. Affiliation is plausible in this setting; firms
located close to each other are more likely to buy from the same suppliers and use similar
subcontractors, potentially generating dependence in project costs. In fact, 30 percent of
items5 on construction projects qualifying for bid preferences had at least two firms bid
the same amount in the data. This statistic suggests that firms may have similar costs of
completing some portions of a project.
To then determine the extent to which affiliation is present in NMDOT highway construction
contracts, compare outcomes under affiliation and independence, and investigate alternative
discount levels, I develop and estimate an empirical model of bidding with endogenous
4This paper also complements the existing literature on auctions with endogenous entry. These papers
include Athey et al. (2011), Li (2005), Sweeting and Bhattacharya (2015) and Bajari and Hortacsu (2003).
5Items are portions of a construction project. The final bid is calculated as the sum of the bids on each
item.
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entry, where I allow for affiliation in firm project costs. The parameter that captures the
degree of affiliation is positive and statistically significant, which indicates that firms do
have affiliated project costs. Counterfactual auctions using alternative discount levels show
that New Mexico’s preference program accounts for a 1.2 percent increase in procurement
costs. At New Mexico’s current discount level, procurement costs are 2.9 percent higher
than would be predicted if project costs were distributed independently. Furthermore, I
find that the proportion of preferred winners is more responsive to the discount level with
affiliation and that affiliation can lead to substantial differences in efficiency at particular
discount levels relative to independence. These results highlight the relevance of affiliation
in the evaluation of public procurement auctions with bid discounting.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.3 gives the details of the New
Mexico procurement process and describes the data. Section 2.4 presents the theoretical
framework by which I analyze the effect of affiliation on bidding and entry behavior, and
section 2.5 shows how I represent affiliated distributions using copulas. Section 2.6 shows the
different ways in which affiliation can affect bidding, and section 2.7 shows how I estimate
the theoretical model. Section 2.8 presents the empirical findings, while section 2.9 contains
the counterfactual policy analysis. Section 2.10 concludes.
2.3. New Mexico’s Highway Procurement Market and Data
This section describes the process by which the NMDOT awards their highway construction
contracts and the data collected for the empirical portion of this paper. The sample con-
tains 376 highway construction contracts awarded by the NMDOT through sealed bidding
between 2010 and 2014 for the maintenance and construction of transportation systems. For
a detailed description of the type of work required on these projects, see appendix A.2.5.
New Mexico applies preferences to resident firms on state-funded projects. Over the sample
period, there are a total 23 of these state-funded contracts while the remaining 353 projects
are federally-assisted projects. An immediate limitation of the New Mexico data is that
there are a small number of preference projects relative to the number of non-preference
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projects.6 In response to this limitation, much of the analysis relies on the empirical model
of entry and bidding. The empirical model allows me to use information in both the pref-
erence and non-preference auctions in identifying the model primitives while accounting for
strategic behavior due to bid discounting.
2.3.1. Letting
Four weeks prior to the date of bid opening, the NMDOT advertises construction projects
estimated to cost more than $60,000. The Contracts Unit is responsible for gathering the
necessary contract documents used during this advertisement phase. Each document is
unique to the work required on each project and contains details such as the location of the
project, the nature of the work, the number of working days to complete the project, and
the length of the project. The NMDOT summarizes these details in an “Invitation for Bids”
document, and I use this document to form the set of observable project characteristics.
Another feature of advertising is providing a rough approximation of firms who could poten-
tially bid for a contract. To advertise potential competitors, the NMDOT publishes a list
of “planholders” ten days prior to bid opening. Firms attain planholder status by providing
some documented evidence that they have the contract documents, either directly through
the NMDOT or through written communication. Moreover, failure to seek planholder sta-
tus results in the bid becoming unresponsive and subsequently rejected.7 Given that the
list of planholders is known prior to bidding and planholder status is required to submit
a valid bid, I use the firms who are registered as planholders as a measure of the set of
potential bidders.8
6Based on my conversations with NMDOT employees, one reason why there are so few state-funded
projects is that a project must be entirely funded by state funds in order to be listed as a state project.
Some projects use a mix of state and federal funds, but if any part of the project uses federal funds, then
that project is listed as a federally-assisted project. Every once in a while, the state will receive “capital
outlay” funds for NMDOT projects or use state maintenance funds or state severance tax funds to fund
entire projects, but these sources of funding are not prevalent in financing these types of auctions.
7For more information on the planholder requirement, see the NMDOT website.
8This measure is not perfect. Some firms seek planholder status after the list is published, resulting in a
larger set of potential bidders than what is listed in the planholder document. To account for this difference,
I include any actual bidders that do not appear in the planholder document in the set of potential entrants.
Moreover, the set of planholders may contain firms that do not have the means to bid as a prime contractor.
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In awarding these construction projects, the NMDOT uses a competitive first-price sealed-
bid procurement auction format. Potential firms who decide to bid on a project submit
bids in a sealed envelope or secure online submission website to the NMDOT. The firm
with the lowest bid (usually) wins the contract, and the state pays the winner their bid.
The NMDOT tabulates and publishes submitted bids as well as an engineer’s estimate for
the cost of the project in an Apparent Low Bids document directly after bid opening. I
use the bids and estimates in these documents as the bids and estimates received by the
NMDOT for each project.
2.3.2. Resident Preference Program
New Mexico offers bid preferences to qualified resident firms on construction projects funded
exclusively by the state. New Mexico implements its preference through a 5 percent discount
on bids, which lowers resident bids by 5 percent for evaluation purposes and pays the full
asking price conditional on winning. For example, suppose that a resident firm and a non-
resident firm are the only two firms bidding for a contract. Furthermore, suppose that the
resident firm bids $1,000,000 and the non-resident firm bids $975,000. After applying the
five percent discount to the resident firm, its bid is lowered to $950,000, it wins the contract,
and the state pays it $1,000,000.
To qualify for resident preference, firms must meet a certain list of conditions. In particular,
firms must have paid property taxes on real property owned in the state of New Mexico for
at least five years prior to approval and employ at least 80 percent of their workforce from
the state of New Mexico. There are also a number of penalties in place to prevent firms
from exploiting residency status. Providing false information to the state of New Mexico in
order to qualify as a resident results in automatic removal of any preferences, ineligibility
to apply for any more preference for at least five years, and administrative fines of up to
$50,000 for each violation. I obtain a list of qualified resident firms through the New Mexico
In order to get a more accurate representation of the set of firms who could potentially bid, I do not include
firms who are unsuccessful in submitting a valid bid during the sample period in the set of planholders.
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Inspection of Public Records Act, which allows anyone to view public documents.
In general, non-resident firms tend to be local despite their status, and resident firms tend
to be more prevalent in the data. Most non-resident firms have offices within the state
(60 percent of bidders and 64 percent of planholders), while only a small number of non-
resident firms have offices outside of states bordering New Mexico (15 percent of bidders
and 12 percent of planholders). Out of the 110 different firms observed in the data, 66 firms
are residents while the remaining 44 firms are non-residents. Resident firms account for 80
percent of planholders and 72 percent of submitted bids, and resident firms win 76 percent
of federally-assisted projects and 78 percent of state-funded projects.
2.4. Theoretical Model
This section provides the theoretical foundation by which I analyze the market for NMDOT
construction contracts. In order to preserve the main institutional features, I model New
Mexico’s market for highway construction contracts as a first-price sealed-bid procurement
auction with asymmetric bidders, affiliated private values, and endogenous entry. The model
proceeds in two stages as in Levin and Smith (1994), Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), and
Li and Zhang (2015). In the first stage, potential resident and non-resident bidders decide
whether to pay the entry cost and participate in the auction. Bidders will enter if their
expected profits from participation exceed their costs of entry. In the New Mexico setting,
the entry cost represents the effort required to gather information about the project and
the opportunity cost of time, which is analogous to reading the invitation for bids and
requesting project information. In the second stage, bidders learn the identity and number
of actual competitors, draw their project costs from a potentially affiliated distribution, and
submit a bid for the project.
2.4.1. Affiliation
I model the possibility of project cost dependence across firms through affiliation. First
introduced into auctions by Milgrom and Weber (1982), affiliation can arise as a result
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of shared subcontractors and suppliers. Theoretically, affiliation describes the relationship
between two or more random variables; if two or more random variables are affiliated, then
they exhibit some form of positive dependence. de Castro (2010) shows that affiliation is
a sufficient condition for positive correlation, so affiliation can roughly be interpreted as a
stronger form of positive correlation.9 Formally, affiliation is defined as follows:
Definition. The density function f : [c, c]n → R+ is affiliated if f (c) f (c′) ≤ f (c ∧ c′)
f (c ∨ c′), where c ∧ c′ = (min {c1, c′1} , ...,min {cn, c′n}) and c ∨ c′ = (max {c1, c′1} , ...,
max {cn, c′n}).
In a procurement setting, affiliation in project costs means that when a firm draws a high
project cost, it is more likely that competing firms also have drawn high project costs. Note
that affiliation essentially gives bidders extra information on the opponent’s project costs,
which is plausible if bidders are located close to each other and share similar subcontractors.
Affiliation is also the key modeling assumption that explains the correlations across bids
observed in the data. Other studies such as Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Athey et al.
(2011), and Athey et al. (2013) explain these correlations under the independent private
value paradigm with unobserved auction heterogeneity. While similar in explaining the
observed bidding patterns, these two approaches have distinct implications on how firms
bid and therefore on how bid preferences affect auctions; a firm’s own cost realization
impacts their belief about other firms’ costs under affiliation but not under independence.
In the data, each project has an engineer’s estimate, which contains a detailed break down
of each project’s tasks. Since the engineer’s estimate explains a large part of the variation
in observed bids, I treat affiliation as the prime explanation for correlations across bids.10
9See de Castro (2010) for a detailed discussion on the relationship between affiliation and other notions
of positive dependence.
10In other environments where unobserved auction heterogeneity may dominate affiliation, econometric
methods developed in Krasnokutskaya (2011) and empirical methods found in Hong and Shum (2002) and
Haile et al. (2006) would be more suitable. Balat (2016) discusses identification in environments with both
affiliation and unobserved project heterogeneity.
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2.4.2. Environment
Turning to the bidding environment, NR potential resident bidders and NNR potential non-
resident bidders compete in a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction for the completion
of one indivisible construction project. Resident and non-resident bidders are risk neutral
and draw entry costs, ki, independently from the distribution G
m
k (·), where m ∈ {R,NR}
denotes whether firm i is a resident (R) or a non-resident (NR) . Firms draw their project
costs, ci, from the joint distribution Fc(·, . . . , ·) with support [c, c]n, where n is the total
number of actual bidders. The marginal distribution for a bidder of group m is Fmc (·),
which allows for heterogeneity in the group-specific marginal distributions. Joint project
cost distributions can be affiliated, but I assume that project costs are independent of entry
costs.11 These distributions are common knowledge to every potential bidder.
Additionally, resident firms in auctions funded exclusively by the state of New Mexico
receive a discount of δ on their submitted bid. In terms of the model, the auctioneer will
lower every resident bid by a factor of (1− δ) when comparing it against a non-resident bid
in a preference auction, so a resident firm will win if its bid is less than the lowest competing
resident bid and the lowest competing non-resident bid scaled by a factor of 11−δ . The value
of the discount is 5 percent for New Mexico residents.
2.4.3. Bidding
After bidders learn their project costs and the number of actual entrants, bidders submit
their bids to complete the construction contract. Heterogeneity in residency status along
with bid discounting leads to group-symmetric equilibria as in Krasnokutskaya and Seim
(2011), where bidders of each group m follow potentially different monotone and differ-
entiable bid functions βm(·) : [c, c] → R+. In particular, a bidder of group m solves the
11This assumption implies that bidders do not base entry decisions on their realized project costs. Samule-
son (1985) discusses the opposite case where bidders are completely informed of their project costs prior to
entry, and Roberts and Sweeting (2010) discuss the intermediate case where bidders are partially informed.
Sweeting and Bhattacharya (2015) study various auction designs when entry is endogenous and selective in
the sense that bidders with higher valuations are more likely to enter. Within a procurement setting, Li
and Zheng (2009) provide evidence that supports a model in which bidders are initially uninformed prior to
entry.
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following optimization problem to determine the equilibrium bids:
pi(ci;nNR, nR) = max
bi
(bi − ci) Pr
(
(1− δ)DRbi < Bj ∀j ∈ NR, (1− δ)−DNRbi < Bl ∀l ∈ R | ci
)
,
where pi(ci;nNR, nR) is the value function, bi is the bid choice of bidder i, Bj and Bl are
the competing bids, Dm is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if firm i is
associated with group m and zero otherwise, and δ = 0 if the auction is not a preference
auction. The objective function illustrates how firms view preference when submitting a
bid. For positive δ, preference increases the probability of a resident beating a non-resident
bidder without requiring the resident bidder to submit a lower bid. Residents therefore
have a higher probability of winning a preference auction with the same choice of bi relative
to a non-preference auction yet face the same payment if they win.12
Let nm denote the actual number of bidders in group m. Furthermore, let
F¯c−i(c1, . . . , ci−1, ci+1, . . . , cn | ci) = Pr (C1 > c1, . . . , Ci−1 > ci−1, Ci+1 > ci+1, . . . , Cn > cn | ci)
be the joint survival function of project cost signals (C1, . . . , Ci−1, Ci+1, . . . , Cn) without
bidder i conditional on bidder i’s signal, and define
β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
=
(
β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
, . . . , β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
))
∈ RnNR−DNR
as a vector that collects the inverse bid functions of non-residents and
β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
=
(
β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
, . . . , β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
))
∈ RnR−DR
as a vector that collect the inverse bid function of residents. The first-order conditions that
12This intuition assumes that all else (opposing bids, object being auctioned, etc.) is equal.
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characterizes the optimal bid is then given by
0 = (bi − ci)
×
[
nNR−DNR∑
j=1
F¯c−i,j
(
β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
,β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
| ci
)
× β−1NR,1
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
(1− δ)DR
+
n−1∑
j=nNR−DNR+1
F¯c−i,j
(
β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
,β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
| ci
)
× β−1R,1
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
(1− δ)−DNR
]
+ F¯c−i
(
β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
,β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
| ci
)
,
where F¯c−i,j (·, . . . , · | ci) is the partial derivative of the conditional survival function with
respect to the j’th coordinate, β−1NR,1 (·) is the partial derivative of a non-resident’s inverse
bid function with respect to its first coordinate, and β−1R,1 (·) is the partial derivative of a res-
ident’s inverse bid function with respect to its first coordinate. These first-order conditions
form a system of differential equations that characterize the equilibrium bids.
A complete characterization of the bidding equilibrium requires one to specify boundary
conditions. Following Hubbard and Paarsch (2009) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011),
I set four group-specific boundary conditions.
The left boundary condition requires that bidders who draw the lowest project cost submit
the same bid while accounting for the level of the bid discount. Let b be the common low
bid. The left boundary conditions for both groups of bidders is as follows:
1. Resident left boundary:
β−1R
(
b
(1− δ)
)
= c.
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2. Non-resident left boundary:
β−1NR (b) = c.
The right boundary condition restricts bidding behavior at the highest possible project cost
draw. This condition can loosely be interpreted as bidders who draw the highest project
cost bid their project costs while making any necessary adjustments for possible discounts
received by competing bidders. The right boundary condition for both groups of bidders is
as follows:
3. Resident right boundary:
β−1R
(
b
)
= c,
where b = c if nR > 1 and b = arg maxb [(b− c) Pr ((1− δ) b < bj ∀j ∈ NR | c)] if
nR = 1. That is to say, if there is only one resident firm bidding on a project, it will
choose a bid that maximizes its expected profits, since the discount may lower its bid
enough to be competitive with the non-resident firms.
4. Non-resident right boundary:
β−1NR (c) = c.
Observe that bid preference introduces another equilibrium feature mentioned by Hubbard
and Paarsch (2009) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011). In particular, if a non-resident
firm draws a project cost c ∈ [(1− δ) b, c], then it also bids its project cost. Note that, as
long as there is at least one competing resident bidder, a project cost draw in this region
for a non-resident will never win the auction, yielding a payoff of zero as long as the non-
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resident firm does not bid below its cost. Since bidders are indifferent between not winning
an auction and winning an auction with a bid equal to their cost, this assumption can be
made without changing the equilibrium payoffs.
Existence and uniqueness of a bidding equilibrium is key in empirically implementing these
types of auctions. Existence establishes that there is, in fact, a solution to the auction, while
uniqueness establishes that the bidders are playing one equilibrium as opposed to potentially
multiple different equilibria. Reny and Zamir (2004) show that a monotone pure strategy
equilibrium exists in a more general setting than this type of auction. Uniqueness follows
from Li and Zhang (2015) for the class of joint project cost distributions that I use in this
paper.
2.4.4. Entry
In the entry stage, firms make participation decisions based on their knowledge of the
number of potential entrants of each group, their knowledge of their own entry cost, and
their knowledge of the distributions of project costs and entry costs. Firms calculate ex-ante
expected profits as
Πm (Nm, N−m) =
∑
nm−1⊆Nm,n−m⊆N−m
∫ c
c
pi (ci;nm, n−m) dFmc (ci) Pr (nm − 1, n−m | Nm, N−m) ,
where the −m subscript indicates the bidders not affiliated with the group of bidder i and
Fmc (·) is the marginal project cost distribution of group m.13 These profits are only a func-
tion of the observed number of potential bidders, since the only payoff relevant information
available to a given firm before entry is the number of potential bidders and its entry cost.
Also note that the subscript is group specific, since members of the same group face the
same ex-ante expected profits. The entry cost distribution determines the group-specific
13When computing these profits, there is a case where no competing bidders enter the auction. This case
is problematic since the NMDOT does not explicitly post a reserve price. The NMDOT does, however,
reserve the right to reject all bids if the lowest price is excessively high. To capture this power to reject bids,
I follow Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) in assuming that firms compete against the government (which is
modeled as a resident bidder) when faced with no other competition.
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equilibrium entry probabilities, which I denote as pm. That is,
pm = Pr (ki < Πm) = G
m
k (Πm) ,
where Gmk (·) is the marginal distribution of entry costs for a bidder in group m. The above
equality follows from the fact that a firm’s beliefs about its competitors’ entry probabilities
must be consistent with their actual entry probabilities in equilibrium. An application of
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem demonstrates the existence of the threshold probabilities
pm.
14 Note here that the existence and uniqueness results from the bidding equilibrium
still hold after entry, since bidders behave as if entry was exogenous upon entering.
2.5. The Copula Representation
One difficulty in implementing auction models with affiliation is dealing with the joint cost
distribution. To overcome this difficulty, I rely on copula methods developed by Hubbard,
Li, and Paarsch (2012). Copulas are an expression of the joint distribution of random
variables as a function of the marginals. Formally, if c1, c2, . . . , cn are n possibly correlated
random variables with marginal distributions F 1c (c1), F
2
c (c2), . . . , F
n
c (cn) respectively, then
the joint distribution can be written as a function of the marginal distributions as
Fc (c1, c2, . . . , cn) = C
[
F 1c (c1) , F
2
c (c2) , . . . , F
n
c (cn)
]
,
where C [·, . . . , ·] is the copula function.
The particular type of copula I use to model the joint cost distribution of resident and
non-resident bidders is a Clayton copula. This type of copula has the following closed-form
14Uniqueness, however, is not guaranteed and must be verified through simulation.
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representation:
C
[
F 1c (c1) , F
2
c (c2) , . . . , F
n
c (cn)
]
=
(
n∑
i=1
F ic (ci)
−θ − n+ 1
)− 1
θ
,
where θ ∈ [−1,∞) \ {0} is the dependence parameter. Besides having a tractable represen-
tation, Clayton copulas are useful in the sense that affiliation only requires θ to be greater
than zero.15 Moreover, θ has the nice interpretation that a higher value of θ implies a higher
degree of affiliation between random variables, so θ contains all of the relevant information
on cost dependence.16
Since I study procurement auctions in this paper, I must model the conditional survival
function. For this reason, I use two results from Hubbard, Li, and Paarsch (2012) to
construct an expression for the conditional survival function using copulas:
Result 1:
The survival function, F¯c(c1, c2, . . . , cn), can be written as
F¯c(c1, c2, . . . , cn) = Pr(C1 > c1, C2 > c2 . . . , Cn > cn)
= 1−
n∑
i=1
Pr(Ci < ci) +
∑
1≤i<j≤n
Pr(Ci < ci, Cj < cj)
− · · ·+ (−1)n Pr(C1 < c1, C2 < c2 . . . , Cn < cn).
This result provides an expression of the survival function in terms of the cumulative density
15For a formal proof of this statement, see Mu¨ller and Scarsini (2005).
16A limitation of the Clayton copula, however, is that there is only one parameter governing the affiliation
between both groups of bidders. If residents and non-residents have different degrees of affiliation between
them, then this setup may not capture those differences. To assess whether this is the case for resident
and non-resident bidders in New Mexico, I calculate and compare the intraclass correlations between bids
for residents and non-residents, where the classes are the separate auctions. I find that the correlations
across bids for the two groups of bidders does not differ substantially from each other or the entire sample,
suggesting that a single parameter governing all affiliation is reasonable.
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function (CDF), which has a copula representation. Let S
[
1− F 1c (c1) , 1− F 2c (c2) , . . . , 1− Fnc (cn)
]
denote the survival copula evaluated at the survival marginals. The first result shows that
the survival copula can be expressed as
S
[
1− F 1c (c1) , 1− F 2c (c2) , . . . , 1− Fnc (cn)
]
= 1−
n∑
i=1
C
[
F ic (ci)
]
+
∑
1≤i<j≤n
C
[
F ic (ci) , F
j
c (cj)
]
− · · ·+ (−1)nC [F 1c (c1) , . . . , Fnc (cn)] .
Result 2:
Pr(C2 > c2 . . . , Cn > cn | c1) = S1
[
1− F 1c (c1) , 1− F 2c (c2) , . . . , 1− Fnc (cn)
]
, where
S1 [·, . . . , ·] is the partial derivative of the survival copula with respect to the first coor-
dinate.
Result 2 shows that the conditional survival copula is equivalent to the partial derivative
of the full survival copula with respect to the conditioning argument.
Given these two results, the second stage profits of bidder 1 can be rewritten using copulas
as
pi(c1;nNR, nR) = max
b1
(b1 − c1)
× S1
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)]
,
where m1 is bidder 1’s group, F
m
c is the marginal distribution of a bidder in group m,
β−1NR = β
−1
NR
(
(1− δ)DR b1
)
, and β−1R = β
−1
R
(
(1− δ)−DNR b1
)
. The first-order conditions
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are now given by
S1
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)]
= (b1 − c1)
[
(nNR −DNR)β−1NR,1 (1− δ)DR fNRc
(
β−1NR
)
(2.1)
×S12
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)]
+ (nR −DR)β−1R,1 (1− δ)−DNR fRc
(
β−1R
)
×S1n
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)] ]
,
where fmc (·) is the marginal probability density function (PDF) associated with the
marginal CDF Fmc (·).
2.6. A Simulation Study
Before moving into the estimation methodology and to illustrate the possible effects affili-
ation can have on bid preference auctions at the bidding stage, I conduct simulations over
a range of different affiliated distributions with a fixed number of entrants. This section
presents the results from those simulation studies. Here, I parameterize the group-specific
marginal project cost distributions as beta distributions in order to remain flexible with their
shape; I set the copula joining these marginal distributions to a Clayton copula. Figure 5
shows the full set of marginal project cost distribution CDFs used in this analysis.
I calculate bid functions in a variety of different environments. Except in a few special cases,
the solution to the system of equations in (2.1) together with the boundary conditions does
not have a closed-form solution. As a result, I approximate and invert each group’s inverse
bid functions with a modified version of the third algorithm found in Bajari (2001), which
essentially approximates inverse bid functions using polynomials.17
I set the remaining simulation parameters to mirror a common New Mexico preference
auction. I set the number of actual bidders to a commonly observed configuration of 1
non-resident bidder and 3 resident bidders, and I set the preference level to New Mexico’s
17See the appendix for a detailed explanation of how I numerically approximate the bid functions.
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Figure 5: Beta (Marginal Cost) Distribution CDFs
current discount of 5 percent. For each marginal project cost distribution, I approximate
bid functions under independence and affiliation, where affiliation is calculated by setting
the affiliation parameter to 1. I denote independence by an affiliation parameter of 0.
2.6.1. Equal Strength Bidders
As a start, I study a case where both groups of bidders are of equal strength. Let αR and
βR be the parameters characterizing the resident beta distribution, and let αNR and βNR
be the parameters characterizing the non-resident beta distribution. I construct the equal
strength case by setting each group’s beta distribution parameters to αR, αNR = 1 and
βR, βNR = 1 so that project costs are symmetric. This parameterization is equivalent ot a
uniform cost distribution. Observe that in this case, the preference is the sole driver of any
asymmetry between bidders. Figure 6 displays the equilibrium bid functions corresponding
to these marginal project cost distributions.
Several patterns emerge from these simulations:
1. With affiliation, a bidder with a low project cost bids more aggressively relative to
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Figure 6: Bid Functions with Equal Strength Bidders (nR = 3, nNR = 1)
independence. Intuitively, competing bidders are more likely to have similar project
costs when the joint distribution is affiliated. A bidder with a low project cost draw
is then more likely to face competitors with low project costs and will, therefore, bid
more aggressively relative to independence.
2. For higher project cost draws, bidders tend to bid less aggressively relative to inde-
pendence. Note that a bidder who draws a high project cost will believe that other
bidders also have high project costs when these costs are affiliated, but her beliefs
will not change when these costs are independent. This difference in beliefs will af-
fect equilibrium bids because a bidder bids less aggressively when she believes her
competition has higher project costs.
3. Affiliation can affect the separation in resident and non-resident bid functions caused
by bid preferences. Indeed, the simulations show that the common low bid for both
groups of bidders decreases when project costs become affiliated. The left boundary
condition then implies that the common low bids are closer together. For higher
project cost draws, there is more separation under affiliation. This separation comes
from both groups of bidders bidding less aggressively and resident bidders receiving a
preference (which makes them bid even less aggressively).
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2.6.2. A Weak Group and a Strong Group of Bidders
Next, I turn to a case where both groups of bidders differ in strength. For this case,
the “weak” bidders are the resident bidders, and I set their beta distribution parameters
to the previous configuration of αR = 1 and βR = 1. The “strong” bidders here are
the non-resident bidders, and I set their beta distribution parameters to αNR = 1 and
βNR = 1.1. Note that this arrangement of distribution parameters generates a situation
where the resident project cost distribution first-order stochastically dominates the non-
resident project cost distribution, which means that residents are more likely to draw higher
project costs. Figure 7 shows the results from this case.
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Figure 7: Bid Functions with a Weak and Strong Group of Bidders (nR = 3, nNR = 1)
Many of the same patterns observed in the equal strength bidder case appear in this case
as well. Bidders still bid more aggressively for low cost realizations and less aggressively
for high cost realizations when their joint project cost distribution is affiliated. The main
difference here, especially when there is affiliation, is the amount of separation due to bid
preferences, and that difference is generated by the asymmetry in resident and non-resident
project costs. The idea here is that the resident marginal project cost distribution now first-
order stochastically dominates the non-resident marginal project cost distribution. Whether
costs are independent or affiliated, this asymmetry causes non-residents to bid less aggres-
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sively relative to the equal strength case, since non-residents are more likely to have lower
project costs compared to residents. Affiliation intensifies this effect in that affiliation causes
residents and non-residents to draw from similar quantiles on their respective distributions,
so a low cost draw for a resident is likely to be even lower for a non-resident relative to
independence.18 As a result, non-residents bid closer to residents under affiliation.
2.6.3. A High Variance Group and a Low Variance Group of Bidders
The final case I consider in this section is a case where each group of bidders has different
levels of dispersion in their project cost distributions. I construct this case by holding
the resident beta distribution parameters at their previous levels of αR = 1 and βR = 1
while setting the non-resident beta distribution parameters to αNR = 2 and βNR = 2.
Observe that this composition of distribution parameters implies that residents and non-
residents have the same mean project cost, but residents have more variance in their project
costs relative to non-residents. Figure 8 presents the bid functions corresponding to these
distributions.
There are a few differences between this asymmetry’s effect on equilibrium bidding relative
to the previous cases. Perhaps the most visible difference is that non-resident bidders bid
less aggressively for high project cost draws and more aggressively for low project cost draws
with affiliation. Intuitively, residents and non-residents become more likely to draw from
the same quantiles with affiliation. When residents have more variable project costs than
non-residents, this property of affiliation means that high draws for non-residents likely
lead to even higher draws for residents, while low draws for non-residents likely lead to even
lower draws for residents. As a result, non-residents bid less aggressively for high project
cost draws and more aggressively for low project cost draws.
18To illustrate this point with an example, suppose that a resident bidder draws a cost in the 10th percentile
of her marginal project cost distribution. Under affiliation, this draw means that competing bidders are more
likely to draw their project costs from the 10th percentile of their marginal distributions. Since the resident
marginal distribution first-order stochastically dominates the non-resident marginal distribution, the project
cost corresponding to the 10th percentile of the resident marginal distribution is higher than the project cost
corresponding to the 10th percentile of the non-resident marginal distribution, so that resident bidder would
believe competing non-resident bidders have even lower project costs relative to the equal strength case.
61
Cost
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Bi
d
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
αR =1, βR =1, αNR =2, βNR =2, θ =0
Resident
Non-Resident
45° Line
Cost
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Bi
d
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
αR =1, βR =1, αNR =2, βNR =2, θ =1
Resident
Non-Resident
45° Line
Figure 8: Bid Functions with a High and Low Variance Group of Bidders (nR = 3, nNR = 1)
These results, although conditional on a fixed number of entrants, have implications for
entry decisions. Bidders who face more (less) aggressive bidding conditional on entry due
to affiliation are less (more) likely to enter because their expected profits are lower (higher).
Affiliation can, therefore, alter entry decisions within and across groups of bidders, which
can change the procurement costs and the composition of actual bidders.
2.7. Empirical Model and Estimation
While the theoretical model provides a foundation for understanding the market for NM-
DOT procurement contracts, it does not lend itself to estimation without further distribu-
tional assumptions. This section outlines the distributional assumptions needed to produce
an empirical model that can be estimated from the data. First, I discuss the distributional
assumptions; then, I lay out the estimation routine. I end this section with a discussion of
how the parameters are parametrically identified through the estimation procedure.
2.7.1. Parametric Specifications
The size of the data requires that I take a parametric approach in estimating the theoretical
model. For this purpose, I assume that an auction, indexed by w, is characterized by the
vector of observables (xw, zw, nRw, nNRw, NRw, NNRw), where xw is a vector of auction-
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level observables that affect project costs, zw is a vector of auction-level observables that
affect entry costs, nRw and nNRw are the observed number of resident and non-resident
entrants respectively, and NRw and NNRw are the advertised number of potential resident
entrants and non-resident entrants respectively. The group-specific marginal distributions
of project costs conditional on xw are given by F
m
c (· | xw), and the group-specific marginal
distribution of entry costs conditional on zw are given by G
m
k (· | zw).
To address entry, I require parametric assumptions on the probability firms assign to the en-
try of competing firms. To this end, I model entry probabilities, pmw (xw, zw, NRw, NNRw),
as a binomial distributions:
Pr (nRw, nNRw | xw,zw, NRw, NNRw) = Pr (nRw | xw,zw, NRw, NNRw)× Pr (nNRw | xw,zw, NRw, NNRw) ,
where
Pr (nmw | xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) =
 Nmw
nmw
 (pmw)nmw (1− pmw)Nmw−nmw ,
and
pmw = G
m
k (Πmw (xw, Nmw, N−mw) | zw) . (2.2)
This assumption on entry probabilities means that each firm calculates the probability
that firms in their group and firms in their competing group enter the auction given their
knowledge of the project and entry cost distributions. Observe that equation (2.2) comes
from the equilibrium condition that beliefs are consistent.
A complication that arises in empirically implementing the theoretical model is the presence
of the inverse bid function in the first-order conditions of the second-stage bidding prob-
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lem. This complication would require that the inverse bid functions be approximated for
every set of second-stage parameter guesses. Instead, this paper relies on approximations
based on indirect methods introduced by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000, henceforth
abbreviated GPV) further extended by Krasnokutskaya (2011) for the case of unobserved
auction heterogeneity and Hubbard, Li, and Paarsch (2012) for the case of affiliation using
copulas. In particular, I infer a firm’s cost from the observed bid distribution by noting
that Fmb (b) = F
m
c
(
β−1m (b)
)
and fmb (b) = f
m
c
(
β−1m (b)
)
β−1m,1 (b).
19 Making these substitu-
tions in the first-order conditions of the second stage bidding problem obviates the need
for estimating the inverse bid function when determining project costs. As a result, the
empirical model will now focus on the marginal distribution of bids, Fmb (· | xw), instead of
the marginal distribution of project costs, Fmc (· | xw).
I place the final set of distributional assumptions on the distribution of bids and entry
costs. In order to have positive bids, allow for affiliation, and allow for heterogeneity across
resident and non-resident bidders, I model the log of the submitted bids as follows:
log (biw) = x
′
iwβ + 
mi
iw ,
where
miiw | xiw ∼ N
(
0, exp
(
y′iwσ
)2)
,(
NR1w , . . . , 
NR
nNRw
, RnNR+1w, . . . , 
R
nNR+nRw
| xiw
)
≡ w ∼ Fw ,
Fw = C
[
FNR1w
, . . . , FNRnNRw
, FRnNR+1
, . . . , FRnNR+nR
]
,
xiw is the set of auction-level observables with an indicator variable for bidder i’s residency
status, and yiw is a subset of the xiw covariates also containing the resident indicator.
Likewise, I assume that the entry costs take the following form:
19For a complete description on how to approximate the inverse bid functions using GPV (2000) in this
setting, see the appendix.
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log (kiw) = z
′
iwγ + u
mi
iw ,
where
umiw | ziw ∼ N
(
0, exp
(
v′iwα
)2)
,
ziw is the set of auction-level observables with an indicator for residency status, and viw is
a subset of the ziw covariates that also includes the resident indicator.
2.7.2. Estimation
I estimate the parameters of the empirical model using generalized method of moments
(GMM). In using GMM, I match the theoretical predictions of the empirical model to the
data by selecting the parameter values that minimize the weighted distance between model
moments and data moments. This subsection gives a general overview of how I construct
and use the moment conditions in estimation. For a more detailed explanation on how to
derive the moments from the empirical model, see the appendix.
I use the first set of moment conditions to identify the parameters of the bid distribution.
These moment conditions are
E
[
xiw
(
log (biw)− x′iwβ
)]
= 0 (2.3)
and
E
[
yiw
(
log (biw)− x′iwβ
) (
log (biw)− x′iwβ
)]
= E
[
yiw exp
(
y′iwσ
)2]
. (2.4)
Observe that equation (2.4) yields the standard deviation parameter, σ, and equations (2.3)
and (2.4) yield the mean parameter, β.
In addition to estimating the parameters of the marginal distributions, the affiliation pa-
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rameter, θ, must also be estimated through the moment conditions of the model. I estimate
this parameter by relying on methods developed by Oh and Patton (2013) to estimate cop-
ulas using method of moments. In particular, one can summarize the degree of dependence
between two random variables by a statistic called Kendall’s tau. This statistic’s equation
for Clayton copulas together with its closed-form solution motivate the following moment
condition:
θ
θ + 2
= 4E
C
Φ( log (biw)− x′iwβ
exp (y′iwσ)
)
,Φ
 log (bjw)− x′jwβ
exp
(
y′jwσ
)
− 1 i 6= j, (2.5)
where Φ (·) is the standard normal CDF.
I use the last set of moment conditions to identify the parameters of the unobserved entry
cost distribution. These moment conditions are
E [nmw] =
∫
NmwpmwdF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) , (2.6)
E
[
n2mw
]
=
∫
Nmwpmw (1− pmw) +N2mwp2mwdF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) , (2.7)
E
[
n3mw
]
=
∫
Nmwpmw
(
1− 3pmw + 3Nmwpmw + 2p2mw − 3Nmwp2mw (2.8)
+ N2mwp
2
mw
)
dF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) ,
and
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E
[
n4mw
]
=
∫
Nmwpmw
(
1− 7pmw + 7Nmwpmw + 12p2mw − 18Nmwp2mw + 6N2mwp2mw
− 6p3mw + 11Nmwp3mw − 6N2mwp3mw +N3mwp3mw
)
dF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) , (2.9)
where
pmw = G
m
k (Π (xw, Nmw, N−mw) | zw)
is the group-specific entry probability. I derive these moment conditions from the assump-
tion that entry is dictated by a joint binomial distribution, where the probabilities bidders
assign to entry is consistent with the actual entry probabilities.
2.7.3. Parametric Identification
This section concludes with a brief discussion on what features of the data I use to identify
the model’s parameters. The parameters of the model are the mean and standard deviation
parameters of the bid distribution, β and σ, the mean and standard deviation of the entry
cost distribution, γ and α, and the affiliation parameter, θ.
To identify the model’s parameters, observe that the data contains a number of different
contracts, each with multiple bids. I use the first and second moments of those observed bid
distributions to identify the mean and standard deviation of the bid distribution parameters.
Within contracts, bids can potentially be positively dependent conditional on contract-level
observables. I use this dependence to identify the affiliation parameter, which is measured
by Kendall’s tau in equation (2.5).20 Finally, I observe resident and non-resident bidders
entering auctions at different rates. In the model, the entry rates correspond to a firm’s cost
of entering relative to its expected profit, and the expected profit can be calculated from
20Note here that a limitation of using bid dependence to identify affiliation is that any unobserved het-
erogeneity would also be attributed to the affiliation parameter. As a result, the estimates from this paper
should be viewed as an upper bound on the affiliation parameter.
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the observed bid distributions and affiliation parameter. I therefore use the entry rates to
pin down the entry cost parameters.
2.8. Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical findings from the NMDOT highway procurement data.
I first show descriptive summary statistics to illustrate some of the main components of the
data relevant to residency status and firm bidding and entry behavior. Next, I display and
interpret the structural parameter estimates from the empirical model and the correspond-
ing cost distributions. These estimates suggest affiliation among bidder project costs and
higher entry costs for resident firms relative to non-resident firms.
2.8.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 12: Summary Statistics for New Mexico Highway Construction Projects
Federal-Aid Projects State Projects All Projects
Number of Contracts 353.00 23.00 376.00
Number of Bidders 1469.00 92.00 1561.00
Number of Planholders 4195.00 261.00 4456.00
Average Bid (in 1000s) 4068.05 5469.58 4156.93
Average Winning Bid (in 1000s) 3522.36 4220.64 3565.07
Average Engineer’s Estimate (in 1000s) 3679.79 4628.75 3737.84
Average Resident Planholders 9.50 9.91 9.52
Average Resident Bidders 2.97 3.39 3.00
Average Non-Resident Planholders 2.34 2.22 2.33
Average Non-Resident Bidders 1.17 0.91 1.15
Fraction of Projects by Type of Road:
Federal Highway 0.59 0.52 0.59
Other Road 0.41 0.48 0.41
Fraction of Projects by Type of Work:
Road Work 0.61 0.52 0.60
Bridge Work 0.20 0.09 0.19
Other Work 0.20 0.39 0.21
Average Contract Observables:
Length (in miles) 5.02 3.79 4.94
Working Days 123.76 121.87 123.65
Number of Licenses Required 1.50 1.48 1.50
DBE Goal (%) 2.06 0.00 1.93
Number of Subprojects 8.14 7.65 8.11
Table 12 contains the summary statistics for all highway procurement contracts in the
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sample tabulated by the source of funding. For each auction, I observe the following project
characteristics: an engineer’s estimated cost, the number of projected working days, the
nature and location of the work, the number of licenses required, the length in miles, and
the number of bidders and planholders. Additionally, I observe the number of subprojects21
as well as any Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) participation goals. I observe
residency status and entry decisions at the firm level.
The top panel of table 12 summarizes the average estimated cost, bid, winning bid, number
of potential entrants, and number of actual entrants. Relative to federal-aid projects, state-
funded projects are slightly larger and more expensive on average. The average estimated
cost across state-funded projects exceeds that of federal-aid projects by about $949,000,
while the bids received on state-funded projects are about $1,401,000 higher than the bids
received on federal-aid projects. The winning bidder bids an average of $698,000 more
on state-funded projects relative to federal-aid projects. Across the potential and actual
entrant dimensions, federal-aid and state-funded projects are similar, attracting around the
same average number of resident and non-resident planholders and bidders. These set of
descriptive statistics also indicate substantial differences in how bidders of both groups enter
auctions. On average, only about 3 of the possible 10 resident planholders become actual
bidders, while about 1 out of every 2 non-resident planholders becomes an actual bidder.
The next two panels of table 12 separate state and federal aid projects by the type of road
and the nature of the work requested. I separate the nature of work into three mutually
exclusive categories: road work, bridge work, and other work. State and federal-aid projects
are similar in terms of their location; roughly 50 to 60 percent of work is conducted on
federal highways. State and federal-aid projects differ, however, in the nature of the work
requested. Relative to federal-aid projects, state-funded projects require less road and
bridge work, while work falling into neither of these categories is relatively higher.
21A subproject is a smaller portion of the main project. For example, if a roadway rehabilitation project
requires the installation of a fence, the fence installation would be a subproject of the main roadway reha-
bilitation project. For an example of project and subproject descriptions in the data, see the appendix.
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The bottom panel of table 12 lists the summary statistics on the remaining project-level
observables. State and federally funded contracts are, on average, similar across these
observable dimensions with the exception being the level of the DBE participation goal.
New Mexico does not specify DBE participation goals on its state-funded projects, which
explains the lack of DBE participation goals observed on state projects in the data.
2.8.2. Structural Estimates
I use the estimated empirical model to disentangle strategic participation and bidding deci-
sions. I use both preference and non-preference auctions in estimation, but I drop projects
with 20 or more planholders for computational reasons – amounting to 1 state-funded
project and 10 federally funded projects. In order to mitigate the effect of unobserved
project heterogeneity on submitted bids, I include the number of potential entrants in each
group in the set of control variables. The idea behind these controls is that unobservable
project characteristics may attract more potential entrants in the form of planholders, since
the NMDOT advertises projects before they publish the list of planholders. I use a rich set
of project controls so that the correlation in submitted bids is primarily generated through
affiliation in costs as opposed to unobserved project characteristics that are common knowl-
edge to the bidders. I include a group-specific indicator for residency status in the set of
control variables to allow for heterogeneity between resident and non-resident bidders.
Table 13 contains the parameter estimates for the bid distribution. The coefficients indicate
that the submitted bids vary according to a project’s size and observable characteristics.
The coefficients also show small and statistically insignificant differences in how the two
groups of bidders bid. Residents bid only 1 percent less than non-residents across procure-
ment projects, which need not be attributed to similarities in resident and non-resident
costs.
Conversely, the affiliation parameter estimate is positive and statistically significant, which
indicates the presence of affiliation in firm project costs. This estimate can be interpreted
70
Table 13: Estimated Parameters for the Log-Bid Distribution
Coefficient Standard Error
Constant 0.849 0.175
Resident -0.011 0.011
New Mexico project -0.034 0.069
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.913 0.020
log(Length+1) (in miles) 0.038 0.015
log(Working Days) 0.070 0.023
Resident Planholders 0.001 0.004
Non-Resident Planholders -0.005 0.007
Bridge Work -0.021 0.033
Road Work -0.0001 0.034
Number of Licenses Required 0.013 0.019
Federal Highway -0.004 0.021
Urban -0.044 0.018
DBE Goal(%) -0.008 0.004
log(Subprojects) 0.077 0.025
Standard Deviation Parameters
Constant 0.697 0.325
Resident 0.263 0.707
log(Engineer’s Estimate) -0.180 0.030
Affiliation Parameter
Theta 0.831 0.189
Note : Standard deviation of the bid distribution is estimated as
σ = exp(b0 + b1resident+ b2engineer), where resident is an
indicator for being a resident bidder and engineer is the log of
the enginner’s estimate.
using Kendall’s tau as a measure of concordance.22 In particular, the value of Kendall’s
tau for the Clayton copula is τ = θθ+2 . Applying that formula to the estimated affiliation
parameter of θ = 0.831 results in a Kendall’s tau of 0.294, which means that a given pair
of cost draws are 29.4 percent more likely to be concordant than discordant.
This tau estimate can be compared to other studies using a similar affiliated private value
framework. On one hand, the Kendall’s tau of 0.294 estimated here is higher than the tau
of 0.06 estimated by Li and Zhang (2015) for the case of timber sales auctions in Oregon,
implying that the costs for firms competing for NMDOT construction contracts are more
concordant than the values of firms competing for Oregon timer sales auctions. On the other
hand, Hubbard, Li, and Paarsch (2012) estimate a tau of 0.655 using Michigan Department
22Concordance is similar to affiliation in that more concordant random variables exhibit a higher degree
of positive dependence. Formally, if (x1, y1) . . . (xn, yn) are n observations from random variables X and Y
such that all values of xi and yi, i = 1 . . . n, are unique, then a pair of observations (xi, yi) and (xj , yj),
i 6= j, are concordant if xi > xj and yi > yj .
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of Transportation data under the assumption that costs are drawn from a Clayton copula.
The difference between the Michigan and New Mexico tau estimates suggests that affiliation
can vary in prevalence across states for similar types of auctions.
In order to evaluate differences in the marginal resident and non-resident project costs, I
use methods of bid inversion developed by GPV (2000) on the estimated bid distributions.
These methods use the equilibrium bid distributions in conjunction with the first-order
conditions on optimal bidding to back out the cost associated with an observed bid. Het-
erogeneity in project characteristics will result in different marginal cost distributions for
each separate project in the data. To keep the analysis concise, I calculate resident and
non-resident marginal cost distributions for two types of projects: one project with the
average characteristics of a preference project and one project with the average character-
istics of a non-preference project. For each of these projects, I simulate and invert bids
from the estimated marginal bid distributions to obtain costs using the average number of
resident and non-resident bidders as the number of participants and taking into account the
estimated affiliation parameter. I estimate the marginal project cost distribution using a
kernel density estimator with a normal kernel and optimal bandwidth, yielding a marginal
cost CDF for both types of bidders.
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Figure 9: Kernel Density Estimates of the Marginal Cost CDFs for the Average Preference
and Non-Preference Auctions
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Figure 9 displays the different marginal project cost CDFs for the average preference and
non-preference project. As evidenced by the shape of the CDFs and consistent with the
observed marginal bid distributions, residents have a more disperse cost distribution than
non-residents across projects. Also, no one cost distribution first-order stochastically dom-
inates the other in any of the average projects, which can lead to ambiguity in the ranking
of resident and non-resident firms in terms of cost efficiency.
Table 14: Estimated Parameters for the Log-Entry Cost Distribution
Coefficient Standard Error
Constant -0.121 0.800
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.565 0.757
Resident 2.256 0.410
Resident Planholders 0.228 0.994
Non-Resident Planholders 0.109 0.244
Standard Deviation Parameters
Constant -0.589 0.190
Resident 1.854 0.301
Note : Standard deviation of the entry distribution is estimated as
α = exp(b0 + b1resident), where resident is an indicator for being
a resident bidder.
Turning to firm entry costs, table 14 presents the estimated parameters for the log-normal
entry cost distribution. The entry parameters have the expected signs and magnitudes,
although some of the parameters are statistically insignificant due to high standard errors
relative to the bid distribution parameters. The entry parameters suggest noticeable differ-
ences among resident and non-resident costs of entry. Residents have higher average entry
costs compared to non-residents and more variation in these entry costs.23 A plausible ex-
planation for these differences is that there may be a separate entry process into planholder
status that selects non-resident firms who have innately lower entry costs, which is outside
the scope of the data and model. The parameter estimates are nonetheless consistent with
the lower conversion rate of potential resident bidders into actual bidders observed in the
data.
23Recall that these parameter estimates are the mean and variance of the natural logarithm of the entry
costs. Let µ be the mean of the natural logarithm of the entry costs, and let σ be the standard deviation of
the natural logarithm of the entry costs. The mean of the actual distribution of entry costs is then calculated
as exp
(
µ+ σ
2
2
)
, while the variance is calculated as
(
exp
(
σ2
)− 1) exp (2µ+ σ2).
73
2.9. Counterfactual Analysis
This section contains counterfactual policy experiments using the structural parameter es-
timates from section 2.8.2. Given the computational burden associated with calculating
equilibrium bid functions, I focus on a representative construction project qualifying for
preference in the data.24 I first describe how I simulate the counterfactuals and then ex-
plore how affiliation and bid preferences affect bidding under fixed participation. As a final
point, I compare bidder responses to different discount levels under the estimated level of
affiliation and independence, allowing for endogenous entry decisions.
2.9.1. Simulation Method
I take a number of steps to simulate counterfactual bidding and entry behavior. First, I
obtain a kernel density estimate of the underlying marginal project cost distributions, FRc
and FNRc , by inverting a large number of bids drawn from the bid distributions implied
by the empirical model using GPV (2000).25 These group-specific cost distributions are
primitives of the model and are fixed across all counterfactual policies and affiliation levels.
Next, I approximate and invert the group-specific inverse bid functions using the modified
third algorithm of Bajari (2001). Different discount levels will result in different equilibrium
bid functions, so I recalculate the bid functions every time the preference level changes. I
use the estimated bid functions and project cost distributions to simulate group-specific ex-
ante profits, and, when entry is endogenous, I simulate entry decisions by comparing draws
from the estimated entry cost distribution and the simulated ex-ante profits. For entrants, I
draw project costs from an affiliated cost distribution using methods described in Marshall
24To construct this project, I take the average of all numerical observables on projects qualifying for
preference as the representative project characteristics. For categorical variables, I use the most common
category as the representative category.
25Note that the marginal project cost distribution will depend on the number of bidders and must be
truncated to be consistent with the theory. Following Athey et al. (2013), I use a common configuration of
three resident entrants and one non-resident entrant to determine the marginal project cost distribution. To
deal with truncation, I truncate the support of the nonparametric project cost distribution to an interval
of 0.5 to 1.6 times the engineer’s estimate, corresponding to an interval with a lower bound of $2,314,400
and an upper bound of $7,406,000. This particular interval is tight enough to avoid extended regions of the
project cost distribution with no density, which adversely affects bid function estimation, yet large enough
to contain the vast majority (about 99.9%) of inverted project cost draws.
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and Olkin (1988), and I apply the bid functions to the costs to determine the counterfactual
bids. The average number of resident and non-resident planholders are similar for preference
auctions and non-preference auctions in the data, suggesting that the number of potential
entrants may not be sensitive to the preference level. For this reason, I set the number of
potential entrants to the average preference auction level of 10 resident and 2 non-resident
bidders for the auction simulations across discount levels in section 2.9.3, but the simulated
number of entrants can vary given draws of the entry costs. I simulate a total of 10,000
auctions for each grid point in a grid of discount levels to generate the auction outcomes.
2.9.2. Affiliation, Bid Preferences, and Optimal Bidding
As a first step in understanding the interplay between affiliation and bid preferences in
New Mexico’s auctions, I use the numerical methods to approximate bid functions under
fixed participation and varying degrees of preference and cost dependence. The bid func-
tions use the cost distributions and the average number of participants associated with the
representative preference project, comparing bids under the estimated affiliation parameter
with counterfactual bids under independence. To investigate the impact of bid preferences,
I compare bid functions across auctions with the 5 percent preference policy and auctions
without any preference. Figure 10 presents the equilibrium bid functions.26
In general, the bid functions from New Mexico resemble the bid functions simulated with a
high and low variance group of bidders, so many of the observations from those simulations
apply to firms bidding on NMDOT construction contracts. In particular, affiliation, which
can be seen by comparing the left two panels and the right two panels of figure 10, causes
firms to bid more aggressively for lower project costs and less aggressively for higher project
costs independent of the level of preference, since competing firms are more likely to have
similar project costs. Another feature of affiliation is that it changes the relative aggression
of resident and non-resident bidders. Comparing the top-left and top-right panels of figure
10, residents and non-residents behave almost as if the auction is symmetric when project
26For an analysis of the error associated with these simulated bid functions, see the appendix.
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Figure 10: Bid Functions under Fixed Participation (nR = 3, nNR = 1)
costs are independent, but when project costs become affiliated, bid functions become more
distinct, with residents bidding less aggressively than non-residents for lower project costs
and non-residents bidding less aggressively than residents for higher project costs. This
change comes from the higher variance in the resident bid distribution; since affiliation
makes it more likely for groups of firms to draw project costs from the same quantiles of
their marginal distributions, low draws for a non-resident are likely to be even lower for
a resident, while high draws for a non-resident are likely to be even higher for a resident.
Residents will, therefore, bid less aggressively relative to non-residents for lower project
costs and more aggressively for higher project costs.
Moving on to preference auctions, affiliation also affects how residents and non-residents
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adjust their bids when there is bid discounting. Bid preferences drive a wedge between
preferred and non-preferred bidders, meaning that non-preferred bidders lower their bids
and preferred bidders increase their bids relative to the no preference case to account for
discounting. The size of this wedge, which can be seen by comparing the top two panels
with the bottom two panels of figure 10, depends on how aggressively firms bid and is
therefore tied to affiliation. Observe that when preferences are offered in the independence
case, the wedge between resident and non-resident bidders is large for lower project costs
and decreases for higher project costs. When there is affiliation, the wedge is smaller than
independence for lower project costs (since firms are bidding closer to their project costs)
but becomes large enough to decrease the separation in the two bid functions for higher
project cost draws. These differences suggest that the degree of affiliation can lead to
substantial changes in how firms adjust bids with discounting.
2.9.3. Alternative Discount Rates, Efficiency, and the Role of Affiliation
Although New Mexico offers a 5 percent discount for its resident bidders, the discount level
for preferred bidders can vary across states and the type of good being procured. Different
discount levels will have different implications for the participation and bidding behavior
of firms, and I investigate these changes in behavior for the representative construction
project using the structural parameter estimates in conjunction with the project cost and
entry cost distribution estimates. In order to assess the role of affiliation in these auctions,
I contrast bidding and participation behavior under the estimated affiliation level against
auctions where costs are assumed independent.
Figure 11 plots the how the procurement cost, the proportion of preferred winners, and the
expected participation changes across affiliation and preference levels. Increasing the dis-
count level increases the average procurement cost in these preference auctions, since there
is less overall participation when the discount level increases. Relative to independence,
affiliation leads to higher average procurement costs for all counterfactual discount levels
because there is a wider range of project cost values where firms bid further from their
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Figure 11: Average Winning Bid, Proportion of Resident Winners, and Entry under Alter-
native Discount Rates
costs under affiliation as evidenced by figure 10. The expected participation rate under
affiliation is similar to the expected participation rate under independence, but the drop-off
in non-resident bidders is more pronounced under affiliation. Despite the similarities in
expected participation, affiliation tends to result in a lower proportion of resident winners
relative to independence, and that difference decreases with higher discount levels. This
behavior comes from how aggressively non-residents bid for lower project costs to account
for affiliation, and that difference becomes smaller with higher discount levels because there
are less non-resident participants.
In addition to changing bidding and participation, changes in the preference level can also
alter economic efficiency. In the auction literature, an efficient auction is one that allocates
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an object to the firm with the lowest cost. Although auctions with symmetric bidders
will always be efficient, auctions with asymmetric bidders, such as the ones considered
in this paper, may not allocate objects efficiently. To gauge how efficiency changes over
preference levels, I calculate the average efficiency loss, which is the average difference in
cost between the lowest cost bidder and the winning bidder over auction simulations, and the
proportion of inefficient auctions for a number of counterfactual preference levels. Project
cost dependence may affect economic efficiency, so I calculate efficiency for auctions with
the estimated level of affiliation and for auctions that assume independence.
Table 15: Counterfactual Preference Simulations
Winning Bid ($ 1000s) Efficiency Loss ($) Prop. Inefficient
Discount (%) Aff. Ind. Diff. (%) Aff. Ind. Diff. ($) Aff. Ind.
0.0 4384.73 4257.80 2.98 4384.33 73.22 4311.10 0.038 0.004
2.5 4411.00 4286.74 2.90 1949.35 893.13 1056.23 0.021 0.014
5.0 4439.36 4313.84 2.91 1106.25 1299.34 -193.09 0.012 0.013
7.5 4454.92 4337.30 2.71 686.37 1328.59 -642.22 0.007 0.009
10.0 4460.31 4343.78 2.68 1298.39 830.01 468.38 0.008 0.005
This table shows the average winning bid, the average efficiency loss, and the proportion of inefficient
auctions under independent and affiliated project-completion costs for 10,000 simulated preference auctions.
Each potential entrant is given a draw from their group’s respective entry cost distribution, and the number
of entrants is determined endogenously by comparing their entry cost to their expected profit. Upon entry,
each participating firm draws their project cost from their group’s marginal project cost distribution to
determine bids. Under affiliation, there will be dependence in the project cost draws.
Table 15 breaks down the average procurement cost and efficiency loss over the counter-
factual affiliation and preference levels. New Mexico’s current policy is responsible for a
small change in procurement costs. An increase in the discount rate from 0 percent to its
current level of 5 percent under affiliation increases the average procurement cost of the
representative construction project by $54,631, which is a 1.2 percent cost increase. This
increase is relatively smaller than the bias associated with the independence assumption.
At the established 5 percent discount level, procurement costs are 2.9 percent higher than
they would be if costs were assumed independent.
Table 15 also illustrates the role of affiliation in the evaluation of economic efficiency. At
the 5 percent discount level, the average efficiency loss under affiliated project costs is
$1,106.25 (0.025 percent of the average winning bid) and generally decreases with the dis-
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count level; the average efficiency loss under independence is $1,299.34 (0.030 percent of
the average winning bid) and generally increases with the discount level. These patterns
reverse themselves at the 10 percent discount level. The proportion of inefficient auctions
under affiliation decreases with the discount level, but the proportion of inefficient auctions
under independence first increases and then decreases with the discount level.
These patterns are generated by differences in bidding under affiliation and independence.
Intuitively, efficiency is driven by the separation in the bid functions, which depends on
both the level of affiliation and the composition of bidders. As bid functions become more
distinct, the likelihood of an inefficient auction increases, and more separation is likely to
increase the average efficiency loss.
With that in mind, the proportion of inefficient auctions first increases under independence
because firms are virtually symmetric when there is no discount, which can be seen in
figure 10. As the discount level increases, the separation in the bid functions also increases,
leading to more inefficient auctions. The decrease in the proportion of inefficient auctions
comes from the change in the composition of bidders. A higher discount level deters non-
residents from entering, so auctions are more likely to be efficient since they only have
resident bidders. The efficiency loss follows a similar pattern.
With affiliation, there is generally more separation in the bid functions with no preference,
which explains why the proportion of inefficient auctions and the efficiency loss is higher
than independence. Although increasing the preference leads to more separation in the
bid functions for lower project cost draws, the bid functions are generally closer together
with higher project cost draws under affiliation. That and the lower participation of non-
resident bidders leads to a decrease in the proportion of inefficient auctions with higher
discount levels. The general decrease in the efficiency loss under affiliation comes from the
proportion of inefficient auctions together with the discount change. As the discount level
increases, both the number of inefficient auctions and the average number of non-resident
entrants decreases. The combination of these two forces leads to a general decrease in the
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efficiency loss. At the 10 percent discount level, the increased separation in the bid function
is sufficiently large to increase the average efficiency loss despite the decreased proportion
of inefficient auctions from the 7.5 percent discount level.
Taken together, these simulations suggest that the discount rate can be used as a mechanism
to increase the proportion of contracts won by resident bidders and alter the proportion of
inefficient auctions at the expense of higher procurement costs. Relative to the independence
case, affiliation leads to a higher expected procurement cost, a lower proportion of resident
winners, and a lower average efficiency loss under New Mexico’s current policy. These
results depend on the discount level, which illustrates the significance of accounting for
affiliation in public procurement with bid preferences.
2.10. Conclusion
In this paper, I empirically examine the presence of affiliation and its effect on procurement
auctions in an environment where preferred bidders have their bids discounted. My analysis
is based on NMDOT construction contracts – a unique environment where resident bidders
receive a 5 percent discount over non-resident bidders in construction contracts using state
funds. For the purpose of measuring affiliation and its effect on procurement, I develop
a two-stage theoretical model, where firms with potentially affiliated private project costs
first decide entry and then decide how much to bid. I implement the theoretical model
through the use of copulas, capturing affiliation through a tractable parametric assumption
on the project cost distribution. I estimate the model via GMM by using moments from
firm bidding and entry decisions.
My structural analysis establishes the presence of affiliation and demonstrates the impor-
tance of affiliation in assessing procurement auctions with bid discounting. I find that the
parameter measuring affiliation is positive and significant, indicating that firms have affili-
ated project costs. My counterfactual policy simulations reveal that affiliation can lead to
differences in the proportion of preferred winners, the proportion of inefficient auctions, and
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the efficiency loss generated from auctions with asymmetric bidders, and these differences
are contingent on the discount level. In fact, I find that although New Mexico’s current
policy is responsible for a 1.2 percent increase in procurement costs, affiliation results in
a 2.9 percent increase in procurement costs relative to independence under New Mexico’s
policy.
There are a couple of areas open to future research. In line with how the NMDOT awards
preferences in its procurement auctions, I focus on how affiliation can affect a particular
type of preference policy where preferred bidders have their bids discounted. An interesting
research direction for the future would be to explore how affiliation acts in settings where
governments use other types of preference policies, such as group-specific entry subsidies
and reserve prices. Also, I have one parameter governing the affiliation between all bidders.
In other settings where the two groups of bidders are more distinct, a richer copula structure
may be a promising modeling possibility.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Appendix for Subcontracting Requirements and the Cost of Government Pro-
curement
A.1.1. Proofs
Properties of the Optimal DBE Subcontracting Decision: Second-Order Con-
ditions
The sufficient condition on optimal DBE subcontracting is given by the following expression:
−P ′′ (si)− ϕ′′ (si; s) < 0.
Observe that this condition is satisfied by the convexity assumption on ϕ and P .
Properties of the Optimal DBE Subcontracting Decision: Comparative Statics
The concern here is in understanding how the optimal DBE subcontracting share changes
with ci. Differentiating equation (1.2) while taking into account the optimal DBE subcon-
tracting strategy yields
1 = P ′′ (s (ci; s)) s′ (ci; s) + ϕ′′ (s (ci; s) ; s) s′ (ci; s) .
After some algebraic manipulation, the above equation reduces to
s′ (ci; s, τt) =
1
P ′′ (s (ci; s)) + ϕ′′ (s (ci; s) ; s)
,
which is increasing given the second-order conditions.
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Derivation of the Bid Function (Proposition 1)
I derive the bid function from an envelope theorem argument. In particular, the profit a
bidder gains from a non-DBE cost realization ci is
Π (ci; s) = (A.1)
(b (ci; s)− ci (1− s (ci; s))− P (s (ci; s))− ϕ (s (ci; s) ; s))
× (1− F (ci))N−1 .
Alternatively, if bidder i is playing a best response, it must be the case that
Π (ci; s) = max{bi,si}
(bi − ci (1− si)− P (si)− ϕ (si; s))
(
1− F (b−1 (bi)))N−1 .
Apply the envelope theorem to get1
d
dc
Π (c; s)
∣∣∣∣
c=ci
= (s (ci; s)− 1) (1− F (ci))N−1 .
Integrate the above expression to get another expression for Π (ci; s):
Π (ci; s) = Π (c; s) +
∫ c
ci
(1− st (c˜; s)) (1− F (c˜))N−1 dc˜. (A.2)
Given that I assume bids are increasing in project costs, it must be the case that any
bidder who draws a non-DBE cost of c cannot win with positive probability in equilibrium.
1To invert the bid function in this step, I implicitly assume that bids are increasing in ci rather than
project costs. Indeed, bids will be increasing in ci so long as s (ci; s) < 1 using the results from equation
(1.5), but this assumption could be problematic if s (ci; s) = 1, since project costs are flat in ci. As a result,
the following analysis only holds for s (ci; s) ∈ [0, 1), but the derived expression for the bid function in terms
of ci will also hold when s (ci; s) = 1.
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Therefore, I set Π (c; s) = 0 and equate the right hand side of equations (A.1) and (A.2) to
get the optimal bid function in equation (1.6).
It is important to understand the shape of the bid function, since there is a region where
two different draws of ci could potentially lead to the same bid. Specifically, the optimal bid
function will be flat in ci whenever s (ci; s) = 1 and increasing in ci whenever s (ci; s) ∈ [0, 1).
This result is intuitive, since prime contractors who subcontract the entire project to DBE
firms will have the same project cost independent of their non-DBE cost. In the data, no
prime contractors subcontract the entire project to DBE firms, so the empirical application
avoids this potential theoretical problem.
Proof of Increasing DBE Subcontractor Shares (Proposition 2)
Proposition. For a given non-DBE cost draw ci, if s (ci; 0) 6= s (ci; s), then s (ci; 0) <
s (ci; s).
Proof. By the first-order conditions on optimal DBE subcontracting,
ci = P
′ (si) + ϕ′ (si; s) .
Given the assumption s (ci; 0) 6= s (ci; s), it must be the case that ϕ′ (si; s) < 0. When that
inequality holds, prime contractors find it optimal to increase their DBE shares si when
there is a DBE subcontracting requirement. There are now three possible cases for s (ci; 0)
and s (ci; s)
2: both solutions are interior solutions, one of the two solutions is an interior
solution while the other is a corner solution, or both solutions occur at different corners. In
either of these three cases s (ci; 0) < s (ci; s).
2Since prime contractors find it optimal to increase the share when there is a requirement, any case where
s (ci; 0) > s (ci; s) is not possible. The assumption that s (ci; 0) 6= s (ci; s) rules out the cases where both
solutions occur at the same corner.
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Proof of Weakly Higher Project Costs (Corollary 1)
Corollary. DBE subcontracting requirements weakly raise project costs.
Proof. Suppose bidder i wins an auction with a bid of b. Without subcontracting require-
ments, he would choose shares, s (ci; 0), such that
s (ci; 0) ∈ arg max
si
{b− ci (1− si)− P (si)} ,
or analogously,
s (ci; 0) ∈ arg min
si
{ci (1− si) + P (si)} .
Define C (si; 0) = ci (1− si) +P (si) as the project cost of bidder i when there are no DBE
subcontracting requirements, and consider the optimal share with subcontracting require-
ments, s (ci; s). Since s (ci; 0) is the minimizer of C (·; 0), C (s (ci; 0) ; 0) ≤ C (s (ci; s) ; 0).
Since fines are non-negative, C (s (ci; s) ; 0) ≤ C (s (ci; s) ; 0) + ϕ (s (ci; s) ; s) = φ (ci; s).
Proof of Weakly Lower Markups (Corollary 2)
Corollary. DBE subcontracting requirements weakly lower markups.
Proof. Proposition 2 implies that s (ci; 0) ≤ s (ci; s) for all non-DBE costs, ci. Therefore,
markups are weakly lower with DBE subcontracting requirements, since
∫ c
ci
(1− s (c˜; s)) (1− F (c˜))N−1 dc˜ ≤
∫ c
ci
(1− s (c˜; 0)) (1− F (c˜))N−1 dc˜.
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A.1.2. Microfoundations for the DBE Pricing Function
My theoretical model takes the DBE pricing function as given in its formulation of the op-
timal bidding and DBE subcontracting strategies. Theoretically, the DBE pricing function
can arise from a variety of different market structures, each unique to the required work.
This section explores two different types of market structures and derives their respective
DBE pricing functions. Throughout this section, DBE subcontractors will have a thrice
continuously differentiable cost function C : [0, 1] → R, which maps the requested share
of work into a cost for the subcontractors. I will refer to that cost function as the DBE
cost function. Furthermore, I assume that C ′, C ′′, C ′′′ > 0 so that the DBE cost function
will result in an increasing and convex DBE pricing function consistent with the pricing
function presented in the paper.
Perfect Competition
Some projects may have DBE subcontractors that behave competitively as price takers. For
these projects, DBE subcontractors solve the following profit maximization problem:
max
s≥0
Ps− C (s) .
The first-order conditions generate the following relationship between prices and costs:
P (s) = C ′ (s) .
In other words, the DBE pricing function reflects the marginal cost of the DBE subcontrac-
tors.
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Monopoly
In contrast to the competitive case, there may be some projects where there is only one
DBE subcontractor in the market. This DBE firm will then behave as a monopolist, solving
the following profit maximization problem:
max
s≥0
P (s) s− C (s) .
The monopolist’s pricing decision that arises from its first-order conditions can be written
as
P (s) =
1
1 + 1
C ′ (s) ,
where  = ds/sdP/P is the price elasticity of demand in the market for that DBE’s services.
In words, the DBE pricing function represents the monopolist’s markup over its marginal
cost.3 Note here that not all market demand functions will result in a one-to-one relationship
between prices and DBE shares; a sufficient condition for this relationship to be a function
is that the market demand’s elasticity is constant.
A.1.3. Estimation Appendix
In order to maintain desirable properties of the model across different parameter guesses,
I must restrict the model’s set of possible parameter values. I include these restrictions
along with details on the optimal weighting matrix and asymptotic standard errors in this
appendix.
3Observe that I implicitly assume that the monopolist firm does not strategically take the fine function
into consideration when determining its prices.
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Parametric Restrictions
I restrict the parameters so that the pricing function is convex and increasing in the DBE
share and the fine function is convex and non-increasing in the share. To illustrate these
restrictions, consider the first and second-order conditions of the DBE pricing function and
the fine function for any given auction:
P ′ (si) =
(
α0 + α1si + α2
si
1− si + α
′
3zw + uw
)
xˆw +
(
α1 +
α2
(1− si)2
)
sixˆw
ϕ′ (si; s) =

2γ (si − s) xˆ if si < s
0 if si ≥ s
P ′′ (si) = 2
(
α1 +
α2
(1− si)2
)
xˆw +
(
2α2
(1− si)3
)
sixˆw
ϕ′′ (si; s) =

2γxˆ if si < s
0 if si ≥ s
.
Observe that restricting α0 > 0, α1 > 0, α2 > 0 and α3 > 0 will generate a DBE pricing
function that is convex and increasing in the DBE share for si ∈ [0, 1). Similarly, restricting
γ > 0 will produce a fine function that is convex and non-increasing for si ∈ [0, 1]. In
estimation, I restrict the structural parameter values to the aforementioned range of possible
values to maintain those properties across parameter guesses.
Standard Errors and Optimal Weighting Matrix
Following Gourieroux et al. (1993), the asymptotic distribution of the indirect inference
estimator takes the following form:
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√
W
(
θˆHW − θ0
)
d−→ N (0, Vθ)
with
Vθ =
(
1 +
1
H
)(
D′ΩD
)−1
D′ΩVβ0ΩD
(
D′ΩD
)−1
,
D =
∂β0
∂θ′0
,
and
√
W
(
β˜HW − β0
)
d−→ N (0, Vβ0) .
Notation wise, θˆHW are the structural parameters estimated from the data, θ0 are the
true structural parameters, Ω is a positive definite weighting matrix, β0 are the auxiliary
parameters evaluated using the true structural parameters, and
d−→ denotes convergence
in distribution. The optimal weight matrix in this setting is Ω? = (Vβ0)
−1, yielding an
asymptotic variance of Vθ =
(
1 + 1H
)
(D′Ω?D)−1.
In practice, I replace the objects of the asymptotic distribution by consistent estimators.
Specifically, I use the following consistent estimators in place of their asymptotic counter-
parts:
Dˆ =
∂βHW
(
θˆHW
)
∂θˆ′HW
and
Ωˆ? =
(
VˆβHW (θˆHW )
)−1
.
In constructing VˆβHW (θˆHW ), the estimator for Vβ0 , I use a parametric bootstrap procedure.
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A.1.4. Estimated Pricing and Fine Functions
DBE Subcontractor Share
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
Pr
ic
e 
(F
rac
tio
n o
f th
e E
ng
ine
er'
s E
sti
ma
te)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Figure 12: The DBE Pricing Function as a Fraction of the Engineer’s Estimate
Note: This figure shows a plot of the price of using DBE subcontractors as a fraction of the engineer’s
estimate, which corresponds to the expression P (si)xˆ . Here, the pricing function is evaluated using
the mean level of subprojects in the DBE-eligible data and the mean level of the unobservable pricing
shock term (σu) when there is an established DBE subcontracting requirement of 7.5 percent.
A.1.5. Relative Cost of DBE Subcontractors
A common criticism of requiring the use of DBE subcontractors is that they are more costly.
To assess whether this criticism is supported by the data, I generate a measure of the cost
of using DBE subcontractors relative to non-DBE costs for the two most common types of
projects with subcontracting requirements: road projects and bridge projects. Given that
these two projects can vary along other dimensions, I use the modal project characteristics
for each type of project in the DBE-eligible data to calculate these measures.
I construct the relative cost measure as the ratio of a prime contractor’s DBE cost of sub-
contracting si percent of a project (P (si)) to that contractor’s non-DBE cost of completing
si percent of a project (cisi). I will now refer to this measure as the DBE cost ratio. When
the DBE cost ratio is one, it is just as costly for a prime contractor to use DBE subcon-
tractors as their own resources, and when the DBE cost ratio is greater than one, DBE
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Figure 13: Fine Function as a Fraction of the Engineer’s Estimate
Note: This figure shows the estimated fine function as a fraction of the engineer’s estimate, corre-
sponding to the expression ϕ(si;s)xˆ . The fine function is evaluated when there is an established DBE
subcontracting requirement of 7.5 percent.
subcontractors are relatively more expensive. Given that the price of DBE subcontractors
also depends on the realization of the DBE pricing shock, I plot this ratio for the 25th, 50th
and 75th percentiles of the shock’s distribution.
Figure 14 illustrates how the DBE cost ratio changes across different projects and price shock
realizations. For both types of projects, DBE subcontractors are likely to be relatively more
costly since the DBE cost ratio is greater than one for most draws of the pricing shock.
There are regions of the pricing shock’s distribution where DBE subcontractors are less
costly, which suggests that DBE utilization is sensitive to the realization of the shock.
A.1.6. Subsidy and Quota Simulations
In this section, I repeat the numerical simulations with quotas and subsidies. I maintain
the environment and functional form assumptions from section 1.5; for completeness, I list
those assumptions below:
• N = 2
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Figure 14: DBE Cost Ratios
Note: DBE cost ratios for the modal bridge and road construction projects. The vertical axis has
the DBE cost ratio, and the horizontal axis has the DBE share. The different lines correspond to
different levels of the unobserved shock on the DBE pricing function, where “low” corresponds to
the 25th percentile, “medium” corresponds to the 50th percentile, and high corresponds to the 75th
percentile of the shock’s distribution.
• ci ∼ U [0, 1], where U [·, ·] denotes the uniform distribution.
• P (si) = ξs
2
i
2
• ϕ (si; s) =

λ(si−s)2
2 if si < s
0, if si ≥ s
• ξ = 2, λ = 3
I set the quota and subsidy to 30% to match the simulations with subcontracting require-
ments.
Figure 15 shows the DBE subcontracting functions when there is a quota (the left panel)
and subsidy (the right panel) and compares them to the subcontracting functions when
there is no policy. For quotas, the DBE subcontracting functions are flat at the quota
share if prime contractors would have subcontracted below the quota and match the non-
quota DBE subcontracting functions otherwise. This shape comes from the constraint that
prime contractors must meet the quota. For subsides, the DBE subcontracting function is
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a rotation of the unsubsidized DBE subcontracting function. This shape is intuitive: prime
contractors with lower non-DBE costs are less likely to use DBE subcontractors when they
are subsidized. An important difference between subsidies and subcontracting requirements
is that subsidies distort the more efficient contractors’ subcontracting decisions less, while
subcontracting requirements distort the less efficient contractors’ subcontracting decisions
more.
Next, I simulate the bid functions, which are displayed in figure 16. The bid function under
the quota is similar to the bid function under subcontracting requirements, but the bids
are relatively higher for prime contractors with lower non-DBE costs. This property comes
from prime contractors losing the option to pay a fine instead of using DBE subcontractors,
which leads to higher project costs.
The bid function under the subsidy is visibly lower than the bid function under subcon-
tracting requirements. This effect is intensified for prime contractors with high non-DBE
costs. Intuitively, DBE subcontractors are cheaper with the subsidy, which leads to lower
project costs. Since prime contractors use more DBE subcontractors with a subsidy, their
markups are also lower, leading to lower equilibrium bids.
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Figure 15: DBE Share Functions with Quotas and Subsidies
My last simulation shows how procurement costs change with the subsidy; this simulation
is contained in figure 17. Interestingly, procurement costs for prime contractors with low
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Figure 16: Bid Functions with Quotas and Subsidies
non-DBE costs are lower with the subsidy, and the reverse is true for prime contractors
with high non-DBE costs. The idea behind this result is that prime contractors with low
non-DBE costs are less likely to use the subsidy but still bid lower than the unsubsidized
case, leading to lower procurement costs.
A.1.7. Invitation for Bids
I gather the majority of the observable variables from the invitation for bids document that
the NMDOT publishes to advertise its available construction projects. Figure 18 contains
an excerpt from the NMDOT’s January 22nd, 2010 advertisement. The first paragraph
specifies the county, which is later aggregated up to administrative district, and length.
The second paragraph lists the project’s components. In my empirical analysis, I take the
component in uppercase letters (in this case, roadway rehabilitation) as the main project,
and I take the following components as the subprojects. The third paragraph gives the
working days, and the fourth paragraph states whether there is a DBE subcontracting
requirement (or goal). The last paragraph gives the licensing requirements.
A.1.8. Additional Regressions and Graphs
Tables 16 and 17 motivate the main modeling assumptions of the paper. Table 16 contains
a regression specification very similar to the first three columns of tables 2 and 3, but I
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Figure 17: Procurement Cost with Subsidies
include a control for firm capacity (as measured by the project backlog of a firm divided
by the maximum backlog of the firm during the sample period) as an additional observ-
able. This regression motivates the absence of capacity constraints in my paper’s main
analysis; the statistically insignificant coefficient on the capacity measure shows that there
is insufficient descriptive evidence in favor of including firm capacity in firm bidding and
DBE subcontracting decisions. Similarly, table 17 is a regression that explores firm entry
decisions as measured by the number of planholders and the fraction of bidders over the
number of planholders. Although entry is typically modeled as an endogenous decision in
these types of procurement models, the lack of an economically and statistically significant
coefficient on the DBE requirement variable suggests that entry is not a first-order concern
in evaluating these DBE participation policies.
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Figure 18: IFB Example
Note: This figure shows the distribution of non-zero DBE subcontracting requirements.
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Note: This figure shows the percentage difference between the share of DBE subcontractors actually
used on a given project and the DBE subcontracting requirement conditional on the project having
a subcontracting requirement. Although there is some bunching at 0 percent, there is a non-trivial
mass of projects where contractors exceed the subcontracting requirement by more than 1 percent.
Consequently, a continuous function is used to approximate the change in incentives induced by
having a DBE subcontracting requirement rather than a discrete function. This figure is truncated
at 15 percent for visual clarity.
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Table 16: Capacity Regressions
Dependent variable:
log(Winning Bid) DBE Share (%)
(1) (2)
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.927∗∗∗ −0.352
(0.017) (0.624)
DBE Req (%) 0.002 1.014∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.184)
log(Length + 1) 0.043∗∗∗ 0.016
(0.014) (0.511)
Capacity −0.019 −0.355
(0.040) (1.161)
log(Planholders) 0.007 1.610
(0.056) (1.940)
log(Subprojects) 0.049∗ 1.432
(0.028) (0.880)
Number of Licenses Required 0.044∗∗ 1.773∗
(0.020) (0.924)
log(Working Days) 0.038∗ −0.613
(0.020) (0.605)
Bidders −0.018∗∗∗ −0.058
(0.005) (0.215)
Federal Highway −0.034 −0.240
(0.022) (0.690)
Urban −0.018 1.899∗
(0.034) (0.970)
Observations 389 389
Adjusted R2 0.985 0.227
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Regression includes controls for district and type
of work as well as month and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are robust.
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Table 17: Entry Regressions
Dependent variable:
Bidders/Planholders Planholders
(1) (2)
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.008 1.392∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.353)
DBE Req (%) 0.0005 0.105
(0.002) (0.087)
log(Length + 1) 0.010 −1.239∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.314)
log(Subprojects) −0.001 3.417∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.589)
Number of Licenses Required −0.022∗∗ 1.194∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.457)
log(Working Days) −0.018∗ 1.554∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.408)
Federal Highway 0.001 −0.543
(0.011) (0.429)
Urban 0.002 1.522∗∗
(0.016) (0.619)
Observations 389 389
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.708
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Regression includes controls for district and type
of work as well as month and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are robust.
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A.2. Apppendix for Resident Bid Preference, Affiliation, and Procurement Competi-
tion: Evidence from New Mexico
A.2.1. Applying GPV to Auctions with Bid Preferences and Affiliation
The first-order conditions in equation 2.1 can be rewritten as follows:
c1 = b1 − S1
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)]
∂S1[1−Fm1c (c1),1−FNRc (β−1NR),...,1−FNRc (β
−1
NR),1−FRc (β
−1
R ),...,1−FRc (β
−1
R )]
∂b1
,
(A.3)
where
∂S1[1−Fm1c (c1),1−FNRc (β−1NR),...,1−FNRc (β−1NR),1−FRc (β−1R ),...,1−FRc (β−1R )]
∂b1
= (nNR −DNR)β−1NR,1 (1− δ)DR fNRc
(
β−1NR
)
×S12
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)]
+ (nR −DR)β−1R,1 (1− δ)−DNR fRc
(
β−1R
)
×S1n
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)]
.
Define b˜ = (1− δ)DR b as the adjusted resident bid and bˆ = (1− δ)−DNR b as the adjusted
non-resident bid. These adjusted bids come from the opposing group of bidders calculating
their optimal bid. Following the methodology outlined in GPV (2000), the marginal CDF
and PDF of costs can be expressed solely as functions of the bids by noting that
FNRb
(
b˜
)
= FNRc
(
β−1NR
(
b˜
))
FRb
(
bˆ
)
= FRc
(
β−1R
(
bˆ
))
and
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fNRb
(
b˜
)
= fNRc
(
β−1NR
(
b˜
))
β−1NR,1
(
b˜
)
fRb
(
bˆ
)
= fNRc
(
β−1R
(
bˆ
))
β−1R,1
(
bˆ
)
.
Equation A.3 can now be written as
c1 = b1 −
S1
[
1− Fm1b (b1) , 1− FNRb
(
b˜1
)
, . . . , 1− FNRb
(
b˜1
)
, 1− FRb
(
bˆ1
)
, . . . , 1− FRb
(
bˆ1
)]
∂S1[1−Fm1b (b1),1−FNRb (b˜1),...,1−FNRb (b˜1),1−FRb (bˆ1),...,1−FRb (bˆ1)]
∂b1
,
which expresses costs as the sum of the bid and a strategic markdown.
A.2.2. Solving for the Inverse Bid Functions
In order to solve for the inverse bid functions, I implement a modified version of the third
algorithm found in Bajari (2001). In particular, I assume that the equilibrium inverse bid
functions for bidders in group m ∈ {R,NR} take on the following flexible functional form:
βˆ−1m (b) = b+
K∑
k=0
αm,k (b− b)k ,
where b is the unknown common low bid and {αm,k} , k = 0, . . . ,K are polynomial coeffi-
cients for bidders in group m. The first-order conditions can now be expressed in terms of
the polynomial approximations. Let α be a vector that collects the polynomial coefficients
of all groups of bidders, βˆ−1NR = βˆ
−1
NR
(
(1− δ)DR b
)
, βˆ−1R = βˆ
−1
R
(
(1− δ)−DNR b
)
, and define
Gm (b; b,α) as the first-order conditions with the approximated inverse bid functions set
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equal to 0 at b:
Gm (b; b,α) =
S1
[
1− Fmc
(
βˆ−1m
)
, 1− FNRc
(
βˆ−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
βˆ−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
βˆ−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
βˆ−1R
)]
−
(
b− βˆ−1m
)[
(nNR −DNR) βˆ−1NR,1 (1− δ)DR fNRc
(
βˆ−1NR
)
× S12
[
1− Fmc
(
βˆ−1m
)
, 1− FNRc
(
βˆ−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
βˆ−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
βˆ−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
βˆ−1R
)]
+ (nR −DR) βˆ−1R,1 (1− δ)−DNR fRc
(
βˆ−1R
)
× S1n
[
1− Fmc
(
βˆ−1m
)
, 1− FNRc
(
βˆ−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
βˆ−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
βˆ−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
βˆ−1R
)]]
.
I evaluate these first-order conditions at T evenly spaced grid points within the intervals b ∈[
b
(1−δ) , b
]
for residents and b ∈ [b, (1− δ) b] for non-residents. I determine b by the number of
resident bidders: b = c if nR > 1 and b = arg maxb [(b− c) Pr ((1− δ) b < bj ∀j ∈ NR | c)]
if nR = 1. In order to capture the flat spot in the inverse bid functions, I assume non-
residents who have costs c ∈ [(1− δ) b, c] bid their cost. Taken together, the modified
boundary conditions are
0 = βˆ−1R
(
b
(1− δ)
)
− c
0 = βˆ−1NR (b)− c
0 = βˆ−1R
(
b
)− c
0 = βˆ−1NR
(
(1− δ) b)− (1− δ) c
Define H (b;α) as
H (b;α) =
∑
m
T∑
t=1
Gm (bt; b,α) + w (T )
(
βˆ−1R
(
b
(1− δ)
)
− c
)
+ w (T )
(
βˆ−1NR (b)− c
)
+ w (T )
(
βˆ−1R
(
b
)− c)+ w (T )(βˆ−1NR ((1− δ) b)− (1− δ) c) ,
where I use the w (T ) terms as positive weights to get the boundary conditions to hold.
Approximating the inverse bid functions is equivalent to finding a vector of polynomial
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coefficients αˆ to minimize H (b;α).
In practice, I set the simulation parameters as follows. I use a cubic polynomial to approx-
imate each group’s inverse bid function (K = 3), and I set the number of grid points to
50 (T = 50). After performing an extensive set of simulation studies, I find that this par-
ticular arrangement of grid points and polynomials produces the most numerically stable
results for the range of actual entrants possible during the counterfactual simulations. I
set the weighting function for the boundary conditions to w (T ) = 4T under affiliation and
w (T ) = 15T when project costs are independent, and I determine these weights by simu-
lating the bid functions and choosing the lowest coefficient on T sufficient for the boundary
conditions to hold during the simulations.
A.2.3. Inverse Bid Function Accuracy
In order to evaluate the accuracy of the approximated inverse bid functions, I assess the first-
order conditions of the resident and non-resident bidding problem on a grid of 100 bid points
for the bid functions displayed in figure 10. Here, accuracy is determined by how close the
first-order conditions are to reaching zero. Figure 19 shows the results. To my knowledge,
the literature has not yet established a benchmark accuracy for the approximation of inverse
bid functions with asymmetric bidders, but the results from this paper’s approximations
appear to be reasonable.
A.2.4. Estimation Method
I estimate the parameters of the model with GMM, which essentially matches the predic-
tions of the empirical model to the moments of the data. This matching process requires
assumptions on the bid distribution and entry cost distribution, which were outlined in
section 2.7.1. For completeness, I list these assumptions below:
log (biw) = x
′
iwβ + 
mi
iw
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Figure 19: Errors for Approximated Bid Functions
This figure plots the first-order conditions associated with the bid functions approximated
in figure 10. I evaluate the first-order conditions on a grid of potential bids, with accuracy
determined by how close the first-order conditions are to zero.
miiw | xiw ∼ N
(
0, exp
(
y′iwσ
)2)
(
NR1w , . . . , 
NR
nNRw
, RnNR+1w, . . . , 
R
nNR+nRw
| xiw
)
≡ w ∼ Fw
Fw = C
[
FNR1w
, . . . , FNRnNRw
, FRnNR+1
, . . . , FRnNR+nR
]
log (kiw) = z
′
iwγ + u
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iw
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umiw | ziw ∼ N
(
0, exp
(
v′iwα
)2)
.
I derive the first and second moment conditions from the first and second moments of the
bidding distribution:
E
[
xiw
(
log (biw)− x′iwβ
)]
= E
[
E
[
xiw
(
log (biw)− x′iwβ
) | xiw]]
= E
[
xiwE
[(
log (biw)− x′iwβ
) | xiw]] = E [xiwE [iw | xiw]] = 0
and
E
[
yiw
(
log (biw)− x′iwβ
) (
log (biw)− x′iwβ
)]
=
E
[
yiwE
[(
log (biw)− x′iwβ
) (
log (biw)− x′iwβ
) | xiw]] =
E
[
yiwE
[
2iw | xiw
]]
= E
[
yiw exp
(
y′iwσ
)2]
.
The corresponding empirical moments are
1
W
W∑
w=1
1
nRw + nNRw
nRw+nNRw∑
i=1
[
xiw
(
log (biw)− x′iwβ
)]
for the first moment and
1
W
W∑
w=1
1
nRw + nNRw
nRw+nNRw∑
i=1
[
yiw
(
log (biw)
2 − (x′iwβ)2 − exp (y′iwσ)2)]
for the second moment.
I derive the next moment condition from the equation for Kendall’s tau for Clayton copulas.
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In particular, when the dependence between random variables is modeled as a copula,
Kendall’s tau takes the following form:
τij = 4E
[
C
[
F iu (ui) , F
j
u (uj)
]]− 1, (A.4)
where τij is Kendall’s tau, and ui and uj are random variables that are related through
the copula C[·, ·] with marginal distributions F iu and F ju respectively. Given the assumption
that the copula is a Clayton copula, the equation for Kendall’s tau takes the following form:
τij =
θ
θ + 2
. (A.5)
Combining equations A.4 and A.5 gives the next moment condition, which can be expressed
as
θ
θ + 2
= 4E
C
Φ( log (biw)− x′iwβ
exp (y′iwσ)
)
,Φ
 log (bjw)− x′jwβ
exp
(
y′jwσ
)
− 1 i 6= j.
The empirical counterpart for the above moment condition is
4
W
W∑
w=1
1 nRw + nNRw
2

∑
1≤i<j≤nRw+nNRw
C
[
Φ
(
log (biw)− x′iwβ
exp (y′iwσ)
)
,Φ
(
log (bjw)− x′jwβ
exp
(
y′jwσ
) )]
−1− θ
θ + 2
.
There is one subtlety in the above equation. The equation for τij (equation A.4) is given for
copulas with two random variables, yet many auctions require that I draw bids from copulas
with three or more random variables. In response to this requirement, I first take averages
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over all combinations of pairs of bids in an auction and then average over all auctions in
order to use all of the information in the sample. In other words, I find the average Kendall’s
tau for each possible pair of bids in each auction and I use that average when computing
the empirical moment condition.
I derive the final set of moment conditions from the moments of the entry distribution.
Given that I assume entry follows a binomial distribution, the first, second, third and
fourth moments of the entry distribution given the number of potential entrants and project
characteristics are
E [nmw | xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw] = Nmwpmw,
E
[
n2mw | xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw
]
= Nmwpmw (1− pmw) +N2mwp2mw,
E
[
n3mw | xw,zw, Nmw, N−mw
]
= Nmwpmw
(
1− 3pmw + 3Nmwpmw + 2p2mw − 3Nmwp2mw +N2mwp2mw
)
,
and
E
[
n4mw | xw,zw, Nmw, N−mw
]
= Nmwpmw
(
1− 7pmw + 7Nmwpmw + 12p2mw − 18Nnwp2mw + 6N2mwp2mw
− 6p3mw + 11Nmwp3mw − 6N2mwp3mw +N3mwp3mw
)
respectively. Taking unconditional expectations over the number of potential entrants and
the project characteristics yields the moment conditions described in section 2.7.2. These
moment conditions are
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E [nmw] =
∫
Nmwp (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) dF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) ,
E
[
n2mw
]
=
∫
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+ N2mwp (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw)
2 dF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) ,
E
[
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]
=
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Nmwpmw
(
1− 3pmw + 3Nmwpmw + 2p2mw − 3Nmwp2mw
+ N2mwp
2
mw
)
dF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) ,
and
E
[
n4mw
]
=
∫
Nmwpmw
(
1− 7pmw + 7Nmwpmw + 12p2mw − 18Nnwp2mw + 6N2mwp2mw
− 6p3mw + 11Nmwp3mw − 6N2mwp3mw +N3mwp3mw
)
dF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw)
The corresponding empirical moments are then given by
1
W
W∑
w=1
[nmw −Nmwpmw] ,
1
W
W∑
w=1
[
n2mw −Nmwpmw (1− pmw)−N2mwp2mw
]
,
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1W
W∑
w=1
[
n3mw −Nmwpmw
(
1− 3pmw + 3Nmwpmw + 2p2mw − 3Nmwp2mw +N2mwp2mw
)]
,
and
1
W
W∑
w=1
[
n4mw − Nmwpmw
(
1− 7pmw + 7Nmwpmw + 12p2mw − 18Nnwp2mw + 6N2mwp2mw
− 6p3mw + 11Nmwp3mw − 6N2mwp3mw +N3mwp3mw
)]
A.2.5. Project and Subproject Examples
This section contains two example project descriptions in the data: one state project (left)
and one federal-aid project (right). The main project is written in capital letters under the
“Construction Consists Of:” line, and the subprojects are listed afterwards.
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NEW MEXICO PROJECT
A300013
CN A300013
Construction Consists Of:
ROADWAY REHABILITATION, Cold
Milling w/Inlay (Flexible), In-Place Re-
cycling and Stabilization (Flexible), Curb
& Gutter w/Sidewalk, Traffic Control
(Phasing), Permanent Signing and Mis-
cellaneous Construction.
FEDERAL AID PROJECT
3100340
CN 3100340
Construction Consists Of:
BRIDGE REPLACEMENT (Replace
Existing Bridge w/3-Span Prestressed
Girders, Approach Slabs, Concrete Bar-
rier Railing), Roadway Reconstruction,
Pavement Sections (Flexible), Earthwork
(Borrow, Subexcavation), Curb & Gut-
ter w/Sidewalk, Concrete Wall Barrier,
Structures (Culverts, Drop Inlets), Ero-
sion Control Measures, Traffic Control
(Phasing), Permanent Signing, Lighting
and Miscellaneous Construction.
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A.2.6. Construction Project Types
Table 18: New Mexico Highway Construction Project Types
Project Type Federal Projects State Projects All Projects
Bridge Rehabilitation 43 2 45
Bridge Replacement 26 0 26
Drainage Improvements 4 0 4
Erosion Control Measures 2 0 2
Fencing 0 2 2
Intelligent Transportation System 1 0 1
Landscaping 1 0 1
Lighting 5 0 5
Miscellaneous 4 2 6
Parking Lot 0 1 1
Pedestrian Trail Rehabilitation 1 0 1
Permanent Signing 3 0 3
Ramp Reconstruction 2 0 2
Ramp Rehabilitation 1 0 1
Rest Area 0 1 1
Roadway New Construction 13 2 15
Roadway Reconstruction 64 3 67
Roadway Rehabilitation 138 6 144
Safety 27 3 30
Signalization 9 0 9
Stockpiling 6 1 7
Structures 2 0 2
Wetland Mitigation 1 0 1
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